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Abstract
In Part I, after discussing the international context, this Article outlines the EEC issues. Part
II traces the early development of freedom of services and shows how there was reluctance to
implement freedom of services. As will be shown in Part III, the European Court of Justice ac-
corded direct effect to freedom of services so that this freedom can be invoked before state courts;
it has preeminence over state rules that restrain freedom of services. Part IV discusses the other
freedoms that contribute to freedom of services. The policy on coordination and approximation of
laws, i.e. the policy on Community legislation, has undergone quite a change, which can be traced
in the field of services. This trend will be explored in Part V. Finally, in Part VI, broadcasting and
insurance will be used as examples of the ongoing struggle between preservation of state powers
on the one hand and the striving for freedom of services in the Common Market on the other.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article will deal with freedom of services in the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("EEC"), as derived from Articles
59-66 of the Treaty of Rome ("Treaty"). In Part I, after dis-
cussing the international context, this Article outlines the EEC
issues. It will be shown how two freedoms - of services and of
establishment - concur in facilitating interstate trade in serv-
ices. Part II traces the early development of freedom of serv-
ices and shows how there was reluctance to implement free-
dom of services. A general program was enacted that referred
to legislative acts that had to be passed by the Council. Such
acts were designed only to abolish discriminatory treatment of
foreigners. This reluctance to implement freedom of services
was slowly overcome in several steps. As will be shown in Part
III, the European Court of Justice accorded direct effect to
freedom of services so that this freedom can be invoked before
state courts; it has preeminence over state rules that restrain
freedom of services. The Court holds now that this freedom
can also be invoked by those who want to procure services
from persons from another Member country. Additionally, the
Court finally accepted in 1986 that freedom of services can be
relied on to prohibit all state legislation that creates a burden
on interstate trade in services not justified by the common
weal, in addition to state rules that deny equal treatment to
foreigners.
The result of this holding is that coordination and approx-
imation by the Community of Member-State laws, i.e., Commu-
nity legislation, is reduced to an instrument of facilitation of
trade in services. However, coordination and approximation
are no longer a precondition for such freedom. This most
cumbersome legislative process of the Community is replaced,
to some extent, by the work of the judiciary.
Part IV discusses the other freedoms that contribute to
freedom of services. The policy on coordination and approxi-
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mation of laws, i.e., the policy on Community legislation, has
undergone quite a change, which can be traced in the field of
services. This trend will be explored in Part V. Finally, in Part
VI, broadcasting and insurance will be used as examples of the
ongoing struggle between preservation of state powers on the
one hand and the striving for freedom of services in the Com-
mon Market on the other.
I. FREEDOM OF SERVICES AND ESTABLISHMENT
The EEC Treaty facilitates trade in services by guarantee-
ing two freedoms. First, Article 52 guarantees freedom of es-
tablishment, which enables nationals of Member States to ef-
fect an establishment in any other Member State so as to
render services there.' Second, Article 59 grants the freedom
to provide services to persons when they are "established in a
State of the Community other than that of the person for
whom the services are intended. ' ' 2 Article 59 thus opens the
door for what Barton calls "transient trade in professional
services."' 3 This Article will deal mainly with transient trade in
services and will neglect to some extent what Community law
has introduced as freedom of establishment.
A. The OECD Approach
On December 12, 1961, the Council of the OECD (at that
time OEEC) adopted the Code of Liberalization of Current In-
visible Operations,4 which provides in Article 1 lit. a that Mem-
bers shall eliminate restrictions between one another on cur-
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
52, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179 - II), at 23, (official English trans.), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 37-38 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 59, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25, 298
U.N.T.S. at 40.
3. Barton, Negotiation Patterns for Liberalizing International Trade in Professional Serv-
ices, 1986 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 97, 110.
4. CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (Org. for Euro-
pean Economic Co-operation 1961). Many Members have lodged reservations ac-
cording to Article 2(b) of the Code, e.g. in the field of insurance. According to Arti-
cle 3 the provisions of the Code shall not prevent a Member from taking action that it
considers necessary for the maintenance of public order or the protection of public
health, morals, and safety. Article 7 provides that Members need not take the whole
of the measures of liberalization if their economic and financial situations justify such
a course. Id.
1988] 349
350 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:347
rent invisible transactions and transfers. 5 There are seven
such restrictions: restrictions on local ownership, on interna-
tional payments, on the mobility of professional personnel, on
technology and information transfers, on market access
through local procurement policy, and on the business scope
of firms.6 These are the major restrictions, which the OECD
Code may have envisioned and which have to be dealt with
throughout this article.7
B. Differences between Article 59 and Article 52
Articles 59 and 52 are distinguishable in two aspects.
First, while Article 59 applies to services only, freedom of es-
tablishment may be used for other purposes, such as the estab-
lishment of a plant in another country in order to produce
goods there. Freedom of establishment also includes "the
right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons
and to set up and manage undertakings . . . under the condi-
tions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country
where such an establishment is effected .... "8 In other words,
Article 52(2) provides for a right of access without discrimina-
tion for those who want to establish in another country.
Second, Article 59(1) declares that restrictions on free-
dom to provide services shall be abolished.9 This rule is not
necessarily restricted to discrimination. In its wording, Article
59 creates only a right to provide services. However, in con-
trast to the right of establishment, there is also a corollary right
5. A review, prepared on the responsibility of the Committee for Invisible
Transactions of the OEEC, preceded the Code. It defines the concept of liberaliza-
tion as follows: "Liberalisation of invisibles as it is understood in the O.E.E.C. in-
volves the removal of restrictions of all kinds, so that the residents of different Mem-
ber countries are, broadly speaking, as free to transact business with each other as are
the residents of a single country." ORG. FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLES AND CAPITAL MOVEMENTS BY THE OEEC
(1961).
6. Noyelle & Dutka, The Economics of the World Market for Business Services: Implica-
tionsfor Negotiations on Trade in Services, 1986 U. CHl. LEGAL F. 57, 77.
7. Multilateral and bilateral international conventions and negotiations as well
as the economics of interstate services are discussed in excellent contributions by
American lawyers and economists in Barriers to International Trade in Professional Serv-
ices, 1986 U. CHl. LEGAL F.
8. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 52, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 23, 298
U.N.T.S. at 37-38.
9. Id. art. 59, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25, 298 U.N.T.S. at 40.
FREEDOM OF SERVICES
to receive services, for example, in a restaurant or hotel in an-
other country.
C. Other Freedoms
Besides those set forth in Article 52, there are other free-
doms that facilitate but are not limited to trade in services.
Freedom of payments as well as freedom of movement for
workers are two examples.' 0 This article is not devoted to
these other freedoms. It will, however, deal with such other
freedoms as well as with Article 52 insofar as it is necessary to
show how they contribute to facilitating trade in services or in
invisible goods, as they are called in the OECD documents.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENT
A. Outline of the Treaty Provisions
Article 59 envisions liberalization of services. Article
60(1) includes those services that are normally provided for re-
muneration. The Court decisions sometimes speak Of "gain-
ful" services. Freedom of services is granted for all trade not
governed by the treaty provisions relating to freedom of move-
ment for goods, capital, and persons." Article 59 liberalizes
everything that is not liberalized by other chapters of the
Treaty. We shall have to see how a delimitation of the differ-
ent trades can be achieved.' 2
Article 60 specifies as services activities of an industrial or
commercial character, of craftsmen, and of professionals. This
enumeration creates borderline cases of broadcasting, educa-
tional, and sporting activities.' 3
Article 60(3) allows persons providing services temporar-
10. See id. art. 48, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 21-22, 298 U.N.T.S. at 36 (work-
ers); id. art. 67(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 27, 298 U.N.T.S. at 42 (payments).
11. Article 60 speaks of services "in so far as they are not governed by the provi-
sions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons." Id. art. 60,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25-26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 41; see Vignes, Etablissemeni et
Services, in 3 J. MGRET, J.-V. Louis, D. VIGNES, M. WAELBROECK, J. DouSSET & M.
SARMET, LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE tCONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 109 (1971) [herein-
after J. MEGRET]; E. WOHLFARTH, U. EVERLING, H. GLAESNER & E.R. SPRUNG, DIE
EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFrSGEMEINSCHAFr 195-96 (1960).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 60, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25-26, 298
U.N.T.S. at 41; see infra Part IV; see also VAN GERVEN, LES NOVELLES: DROIT DES COM-
MUNAUTES EUROPtENNES 741 (1969) (No. 1856). One commentator has stated, "La
1988]
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ily to pursue their activity in the State where the service is pro-
vided. ' 4
Article 61 (1)'5 refers to a specific title of the Treaty with
respect to transport.' 6 Article 61(2) orders the liberalization of
banking and insurance connected with movements of capital to
be effected in step with the progressive liberalization of move-
ment of capital.' 7 Directives have been enacted to achieve this
liberalization. "
Article 63 seeks to attain implementation of freedom of
services by two steps: first by drawing up a general program
and then by enacting directives.' 9
B. The Background
1. The Spaak Report
In preparing the so-called "relance europenne," the
Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community
had established a Commission whose chairman was the Bel-
gian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak. The Commission's
Final Report, published on April 21, 1956,20 did not mention
freedom of establishment but devoted a whole chapter to free-
dom of services. It started from the OECD Code and men-
tioned that services must be understood more narrowly than
trade in invisibles, liberalization of which is envisioned in the
OECD Code.2'
notion de prestation de services' vis~e par les articles 59 a 66 est aussi limit~e aux
services rendus dans des buts 6conomiques .... " Id.
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 60, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25-26, 298
U.N.T.S. at 41.
15. Articles 55 and 66 exclude the exercise of official authority from freedom of
establishment and of services, and authorize the Council to exclude further activities.
No serious problems have arisen so far.
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 61(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298
U.N.T.S. at 41; see also European Parliament v. Council, Case 13/83, 1985 E.C.R.
1513, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,191 (holding that the Council violated the
Treaty by not implementing freedom of services in the field of transport).
17. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 61(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298
U.N.T.S. at 41.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 63, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298
U.N.T.S. at 41-42.
20. REGIERUNGSAUSSCHUSS, EINGESETZT VON DER KONFERENZ VON MESSINA, BER-
ICHT DER DELEGATIONSLEITER AN DIE REGIERUNGSCHEFS (1956).
21. The Final Report defines its aims for the future as follows:
1. Mit Vorrang sollen diejenigen Dienstleistungen behandelt werden, die
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Two points should be highlighted: First, although realiz-
ing that production of and trade in services becomes more and
more important for a modern economy, the report accorded
priority to those services that bear on goods, i.e., hardware.
Production of and trade in goods still take priority when it
comes to liberalization.
Second, the Report states that a distinction must be made
between two sorts of national acts and rules which potentially
restrict trade in services: those that serve public policy and the
common weal, and those that protect producers of services.
2. Response in the EEC Treaty
a. Fundamental Right
The EEC Treaty responds to these two statements. Arti-
cle 3(c) includes freedom of services in the "activities" of the
Community on the same terms as it includes free movement of
unmittelbar und wesentlich die Produktionskosten beeinflussen und deren
Liberalisierung zum Funktionieren des Gemeinsamen Marktes fur Giiter
beitragt,
2. Es muss darauf geachtet vorgesehenen, dass die in den einzelstaatlichen
Vorschriften vorgesehenen Bedingungen, so lange sie bestehen bleiben,
ohne Diskriminierung nach Wohnsitz und Staatsangeh6rigkeit angewendet
werden.
3. Fir die freien Berufe, zu deren Ausibung Universititsdiplome n6tig
sind, ist eine m6glichst weitgehende Gleichwertigkeit und Gleichstelling
anzustreben.
4. Die bestehenden Regelungen miissen daraufhin iiberpriift werden, in-
wiewelt und mittels welcher Anderungen sie Notwendigkeiten der 6ffen-
tlichen Ordnung entsprechen oder ob sie vielmehr ein System zum Schutz
oder zur Erhaltung von Vorzugsstellungen darstellen.
(1. Those services that exert direct, important, and positive influence on
production costs of the goods of the Common Market and contribute to
liberalization of its function, must be accorded top priority.
2. Care must be taken that those regulations spelled out by the individual
Member States be applied to all, without discrimination, as to place of resi-
dence and citizenship.
3. For the freestanding professions, requiring university diplomas for their
practice, the widest possible equality and equivalency is to be sought.
4. Existing regulations must be carefully examined to ascertain the extent to
which they carry out the needs of the public and commonwealth; and if nec-
essary, what changes thereof are required to achieve this. Hence, to estab-
lish with certainty that other systems do not achieve undue preferential sta-
tus or protection.)
Id. at 45.
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goods, in Article 3(a). 22 Relying on these clauses, the Court
has held that freedom of services, like free movement of
goods, is one of the fundamental rights granted by the EEC
Treaty.23
There is a distinction, however, according to whether
services are connected with trade in goods. This corresponds
to the Commission's report and will be dealt with under c. be-
low. Moreover, Article 61 provides for some exceptions for
transport, banking, and insurance insofar as they include
movements of capital.
b. Public Policy
Article 66, by referring, inter alia, to Article 56, permits
safeguarding public policy, public security, and public health,
in the States where those services are provided.24 It will be
shown that the protection of these public goods is incorpo-
rated also in the interpretation of Article 59.
c. The Treaty's Plan For Implementation of the Program
In contrast to the Treaty's rigidity as to free movement of
goods, Article 63 is flexible with the implementation of free-
dom of services. First, a general program for the abolition of
existing restrictions on services had to be devised by the Coun-
cil. 25 Second, such a program would have to treat each service
individually. For example, Article 63(3) accords priority to
those services that directly affect production costs or promote
trade in goods.26 Finally, Article 63(2) requires that the aboli-
tion of restrictions be implemented by Council directives pro-
posed by the Commission after consultation with the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Assembly.27 This proce-
22. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 15-16.
23. Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, -, 54, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339, at 17,162; Webb, Case 279/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 3325,
17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784 at 7332; Watson and Belmann, Case
118/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 1198, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8368 at 7681.
24. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 27, 298
U.N.T.S. at 42.
25. Id. art. 63(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 41.
26. Id. art. 63(3), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 42.
27. Id. art. 63(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298 U.N.T.S. at 42.
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dure guaranteed that economic as well as the social problems
of services, from insurance to health care, were taken care of.
C. The General Program
1. Outline of the Program
On December 18, 1961, the Council approved both the
program to implement freedom of services,28 in accordance
with Article 63(1), and a program dealing with freedom of es-
tablishment. On the whole, the program on services aims at
opening access to the market of other countries. Its insistence
on the applicability of the law of the countries where a service
is rendered implied, however, that it did not aim at anything
like an internal market, as shall be completed under the Single
European Act and is envisioned in the OECD document
quoted above.
The main provisions of the program are the following:
0 Section II provides for free entry and exit from other
countries for the benefit of all nationals of Member States.
The right of permanent residence is also included.
0 According to Section III, foreigners must not be dis-
criminated against, and all State measures imposed specifically
on nationals of other countries must be suppressed. This pro-
vision applies also to measures that do not constitute express
discrimination but do in fact put a burden mainly on foreign-
ers.
0 We do not insist on the question whether the program
really attacks only discriminatory measures. But it must be
stressed that, according to the program,, restrictions must be
abolished, no matter whether they were imposed on the pro-
vider of the services directly, or whether they are created indi-
rectly, via the receiver of the services. For example, a social
security regulation that excluded reimbursement for medical
treatment in another EEC country would be an impermissible
indirect restriction.
9 A time schedule, in Section V, does not distinguish be-
tween different kinds of services, but also adds specific rules
for governments procuring construction services from indus-
tries in other countries. Construction is a service within the
28. Oj. L 32/62 (1962), Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1974, at 3.
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meaning of the Treaty.29 Government interests, however,
should be protected according to the program by a quota sys-
tem and a principle of reciprocity.
0 Recognition of foreign diploma and other qualifications,
according to Section IV, shall be made a subject of investiga-
tion.
While the program addressed restrictions imposed on the
receiver of services that had a negative effect on the provider,
it did not raise the question whether receivers should have an
independent right, enabling them to choose between domestic
and foreign offers for services.3 0
The program, though voted unanimously by the Council,
has no binding effect.3 ' However, it has influenced strongly
the Community's activities in the fields of harmonization and
of coordination of laws.
2. Early Attitude of the Commission
In 1960,32 the Commission had released a document
whose attitude was described as more liberal by Maestripieri. 3
It concluded that:
- In a number of cases, freedom of services has an abso-
lute character as opposed to the relative character of free-
dom of establishment: as in free movement of goods or
capital, it is the elimination of restrictions, and not the elim-
ination of discriminatory restrictions, which is aimed at:
- the obstacles that inconvenience the recipient of serv-
ices, that is to say, the limits on the acquisition of services
and on its direct effect, as one will see later, are of great
29. Transporoute v. Minister of Public Works, Case 76/81 1982 E.C.R. 417,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8812.
30. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83,
1984 E.C.R. 377, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038.
31. C. MAESTRIPIERI, LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES PERSONNES ET DES SERVICES
DANS LA CEE 60 (1972).
General Advocate Warner found that the program was "on any view incom-
plete" and that it "did not lie within the power of the Council, by the General Pro-
gram, to narrow the scope of Article 59-any more than it lay within its power to widen
it. In any case, the Council did not purport to do any such thing." Walrave v. UCI
[Union Cycliste Internationale], Case 36/74 1974 E.C.R. 1405, 1425, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8290, at 7347.
32. Doc. III/COM (60) 92 final, at 22 (Jul. 28, 1960), reprinted in C. MAES-
TRIPIERI, supra note 31, at 48.
33. C. MAESTRIPIERI, supra note 31, at 47.
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importance because, however indirectly, they affect without
any doubt the provider of services, sometimes even very ap-
preciably;
- however, equal treatment remains the rule when the
provider moves to the recipient's country to furnish a ser-
vice there (one may then say that the conditions of earning
profits for such services are those of establishment without
the duration).34
As early as 1960, the Commission posed the crucial ques-
tions in this area: Should freedom of services be approached
in a manner analogous to free movement of goods or to free-
dom of establishment? And further: Does the Treaty protect
the interests only of providers of services, or also of the receiv-
ers of such services who may wish to have more choices in the
Common Market?
D. Early Implementation of Council Directives
1. van Binsbergen
In 1974, the Court in van Binsbergen described how free-
dom of services should have been implemented by legislation.
The Court said:
2 1. Within the scheme of the chapter relating to the provi-
sion of services, these directives are intended to accomplish
different functions, the first being to abolish, during the
transitional period, restrictions on freedom to provide serv-
ices, the second being to introduce into the law of the Mem-
ber States a set of provisions intended to facilitate the effec-
tive exercise of this freedom, in particular by the mutual
34. Doc. III/COM (60) 92 final, at 22 (Jul. 28, 1960), reprinted in C.
MAESTRIPIERI, supra note 31, at 48. The original reads as follows:
- dans de nombreux cas, la libert6 des services a un caract~re absolu, qui
s'oppose au caract~re relatif du libre kablissement: comme dans la libre
circulation des marchandises ou des capitaux, c'est l'limination des
restrictions, et non celle des restrictions discriminatoires, qui est vise;
- les obstacles qui g~nent le destinataire (c'est-a-dire les limites A la libert6
d'acquisition de la prestation et son plein effet, ainsi qu'on le verra plus
loin) sont d'une grande importance puisque, bien qu'indirectement, ils
atteignent sans aucun doute le prestataire, parfois mme tr6 sensiblement;
- c'est cependant l'6galit de traitement qui reste la r~gle, lorsque le
prestataire se d6place dans le pays du destinataire pour y fournir le service
(on peut alors dire que les conditions de r~alisation de la prestation sont
celles de l'tablissement sans la dur&e).
Id. at 22, reprinted in C. MAESTRIPIERI, supra note 31, at 48.
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recognition of professional qualifications and the coordina-
tion of laws with regard to the pursuit of activities as self-
employed persons.
22. These directives also have the task of resolving the spe-
cific problems resulting from the fact that where the person
providing the service is not established, on a habitual basis,
in the State where the service is performed he may not be
fully subject to the professional rules of conduct in force in
that State. 5
2. Legislation by the Council
Community commentator Maestripieri has reported that
by the end of 1971 the Council had adopted thirty-nine direc-
tives with respect to services.36 Most directives removed re-
strictions, but others enacted so-called transitory measures or
dealt with coordination of laws.
The legislative work performed over the ten-year period
from 1961 to 1971 was considerable. However, it was in no
way sufficient to fully implement the program and, therefore
guaranteeing freedom of services within the Community. The
reasons for the failure are easy to explain. First, each profes-
sion requires separate, specific rules with respect to standards
and education. Such rules must be enacted one by one.
Additionally, services include such sensitive areas as insur-
ance, where harmonization of laws and coordination of regula-
tion and administrative practice raise problems of public pol-
icy. The Council cannot be expected to agree easily on solu-
tions that do not coincide with the former laws of the States.
Two instruments have been devised to overcome the diffi-
culties of the legislative process. One is a new and more mod-
est approach to harmonization and coordination than the pro-
gram contained. The other one is so-called direct applicability
or effect of freedom of services. Direct effect means that State
measures that restrain services are forbidden ipso iure; such
measures need not be abolished by directives as had been envi-
sioned in the program.
35. Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging Metaalnijverheid, Case 33/74, 1974
E.C.R. 1299, 1311, 21-22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8282, at 7212.
The problems dealt with under recital 22 may be compared to those raised in
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
36. C. MAESTRIPIERI, supra note 31, at 96.




Direct effect or applicability is a well-known concept of
Community law by which the majority of fundamental free-
doms of the EEC Treaty create individual rights that the na-
tional courts must protect. The rights can be invoked before
these courts without implementation by legislative acts.38
Thus, the difficulties of the Community's legislative process
are to some extent overcome.
Direct effect presupposes that Articles of the EEC Treaty
are self-executing and that the relevant transitional period has
expired. Article 8(7) declares that "the expiry of the transi-
tional period shall consitute the latest date by which all the
rules laid down must enter into force and all measures re-
quired for establishing the common market must be imple-
mented." 39
2. Services
Eleven years after the leading case of van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 40 accorded direct effect
of an Article, the Court decided in van Binsbergen v. Bedriffsver-
eniging Metaalnijverheid 41 that the first paragraph of Article 59
and the third paragraph of Article 60 have direct effect and
37. The leading case is van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Be-
lastingen, Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008. Judge
Pescatore spoke of an "infant disease." Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect'" An
Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983).
38. Commission v. Italy, Case 193/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3019, 3033, 17, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8788, at 7364. The Court stated:
The fundamental principle of a unified market and its corollary, the free
movement of goods, may not under any cirumstances be made subject to
the condition that there should first be an approximation of national laws,
for if that condition had to be fulfilled the principle would be reduced to a
mere cipher.
Id. This is confirmed in van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsverening Metaalnijverhoid, 1974
E.C.R. 1299, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8282; see infra note 41.
39. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8(7), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 5, 298
U.N.T.S. at 18.
40. Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.R. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8008.
41. van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. at 1311-12, 23-26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8282, at 7212. In paragraph 26, the Court says: "Articles 59 and 60 impose a well-
defined obligation, the fulfillment of which by the Member States cannot be delayed
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may be relied on before national courts. In its arguments, the
Court mentioned, inter alia, that in light of Article 8(7), Article
59 became unconditional on the expiration of the transitional
period.
B. The Activities Covered by Direct Effect
1. The Early Cases
In van Binsbergen the Court had to decide whether a legal
representative is entitled to act for parties where representa-
tion by an "advocaat" is not obligatory.4 2
In Sacchi,4 3 the Court did not have to answer a question on
the direct effect of Article 59. But the case is important for the
delimitation of freedom of services. The Court considered an
Italian law that granted exclusive rights in the field of televi-
sion, i.e., for broadcasting and for transmitting by cable. The
question was not whether state monopolies in this field violate
Article 59. Instead, the Court was asked to decide whether
freedom of movement of goods is restrained if the monopoly
includes advertising.
The answer may be in the affirmative if domestic products
are favored., Regulation of services in that case has an indirect
impact on advertising for, and free movement of, goods.
Therefore this latter freedom is to be relied upon. The Court
found that transmission of television signals, including those in
the nature of advertisements, must be regarded as provision of
services. Services may, however, come under the provisions
relating to the free movement of goods if trade in goods is re-
stricted. This confirms that Articles 59 and 60 have to be ap-
plied wherever other freedoms do not cover a specific trade.
Walrave v. UC14 4 concerned rules of a federation in the
field of sports, specifically, cycling behind motorcycles. The
rule in question stated that the pacemaker must have the same
nationality as the stayer.4" Because this rule discriminated
or jeopardized by the absence of provisions which were to be adopted in pursuance
of powers conferred under Articles 63 and 66." Id.
42. Id. at 1307-08, 1-4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8282, at 7210-11.
43. Case 155/73, 1974 E.C.R. 409, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8267.
44. Case 36/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290.
45. A stayer is the teammate on the bicycle who follows the pacer, his teammate
on the motorcycle, whose function it is to create a moving vacuum for the stayee. Id.
at 1417, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290, at 7342.
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against other nationals, the Court found that Article 59 also
can apply to rules of a federation. 46 The Court held that with
respect to Article 2, sports are subject to Community law
only insofar as they are remunerated services,48 in which case
sports comes within the scope of Article 59. Foreigners must
therefore not be excluded from such activity. 49 The prohibi-
tion of such discrimination, however, does not affect the com-
position of sports teams, especially national sports teams, be-
cause the formation of such teams is a question of purely
sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic
activity.5 °
Only the second aspect of the Court's holding is of inter-
est here. The judgment indicates that the jurisdiction of the
Community is not limited to the economy in a narrow sense,
but such jurisdiction extends to all sectors of life insofar as they
are touched by Community rules. This applies not only to
sports, but also to defense, education, and other fields. The
Advocate General, Mr. Warner, told the Court that he has no
doubt that Article 59 has direct effect on these areas.5'
Indication that tourism may be included in freedom of
services may be found in Watson and Belmann.52 Watson dealt
w ith a complex issue of Italian registration formalities for for-
eigners and the issue of whether such formalities create obsta-
cles for the freedom of movement for persons.53 The Italian
judge, who had referred the case to the Court under Article
177, 54 had not explained why a young English girl living with
46. Id. at 1422, 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290, at 7344.
47. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 15.
48. Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1421, T1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290, at
7344.
49. Id. at 1417, 5-6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8290, at 7342-43.
50. Id. at 1421, T 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290, at 7344.
51. Id. at 1424, 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290, at 7346. In Coenen v.
Sociaal-Economische Raad, Article 59 was applied to the activities of an insurance inter-
mediary. Case 39/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1547, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8332.
52. Case 118/75, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8368.
53. See id. at 1195-96, TT 1-5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8368, at 7679. Free
movement of persons, as included in Article 3 lit. c, has been granted by Directive
No. 73/148 of May 21, 1973 with regard to establishment and the provision of serv-
ices.
54. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 58, 298
U.N.T.S. at 76-77.
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an Italian family had come to Italy. The Advocate General, Mr.
Trabucchi, discussed two possibilities.55 If she came to Italy as
an "au pair," she was rendering services, so that freedom of
services could come into play. But what if she came as a tour-
ist? The Advocate General noted that there is a strong ten-
dency to include tourism in freedom of services. He hesitated,
however, to extend free movement to cases involving tourists,
because otherwise there would remain no limits to the freedom
of movement of persons. Although the Court did not have to
pronounce on that question, it does not seem to share the hesi-
tations of the Advocate General. The case suggests that tour-
ism is included in the freedom of services.56
In the 1978 Koestler case, a bank carrying out orders on a
stock exchange was considered to be tendering a service that
must be evaluated under Article 59.57 A few months later, in
the van Wesemael case, the activities of an employment agent for
entertainers were held to be subject to Article 59.58
2. Recent Cases
It may be noted that all the preceding cases were decided
before the famous Cassis de Dijon case,59 which opened the door
for a wide, though restricted direct application of Article 30 on
the movement of goods.
The 1980 judgment in Debauve60 confirmed Sacchi insofar
as it took for granted that both broadcasting and cable televi-
sion are activities subject to Article 59. The Court in Debauve
55. Watson, 1976 E.C.R. at 1202, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8368, at
7682.
56. Accord Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, Joined Cases 286/82 and
26/83, 1984 E.C.R. 377, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038. The direct effect of
Articles 59(1) and 60(3) is confirmed in the last of the series of cases dating from
1974 to 1976. Dond v. Mantero upheld Walrave in the context of football. Don v.
Mantero, Case 13/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, 1341, 17-20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1 8369, at 7694-95.
57. Socit6 G6nrale Alsacienne de Banque v. Koestler, Case 15/78, 1978
E.C.R. 1971, 1978, 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8514, at 7309.
58. Minist~re Public and A.S.B.L. v. van Wesemael, Joined Cases 110 and
111/78, 1979 E.C.R. 35, 52, 28-29, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8533, at 7649-
50.
59. Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979
E.C.R. 649, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543.
60. Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, Case 52/79, 1980 E.C.R. 833, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8661.
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construed Article 59 for the first time along the criteria that it
had fixed in Cassis de D'on for Article 30.61
Again in 1980, the first Coditel case discusses broadcasting
and diffusion of television as services under Article 59 and dis-
cusses whether Articles 59 and 60 "prohibit an assignment,
limited to the territory of a Member State, of the copyright in a
film."'62 Here again, one may be struck by the'parallel of Arti-
cles 30 and 59 with respect to industrial and intellectual prop-
erty, the use of which may be an instrument to partition the
common market.
Transporoute v. Minister of Public Works, decided in 1982,
dealt with an invitation to tender bids under public-works con-
tracts.63 Two directives of the Council had already contributed
to freedom of services in this field.64 Slightly earlier in Webb,
provision of manpower was categorized as provision of serv-
ices. 65
In Haug-Adrion v. Frankfurter Versicherungs-AG,66 plaintiff, an
official of the Commission, introduced Article 59. A German
insurer had refused to grant plaintiff a bonus for a car regis-
tered under customs plates for purposes of transferring the car
from Germany to Brussels. The Advocate General, Mr. Lenz,
was of the opinion that only rights of the receiver and not of
the provider of services were at issue, and that, therefore, Arti-
cle 59 could not be invoked. 67 The Court refered to Article 59
together with Articles 768 and 4869 to find out whether the in-
surer was illegally discriminating against plaintiff. The Court
did not question that any discrimination in that case could be
caused only by the insurer's general conditions. This action of
the Court may be deemed to confirm Walgrave, according to
61. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 13, 298
U.N.T.S. at 26.
62. Coditel v. Cine Vog Films, Case 62/79, 1980 E.C.R. 881, 902, 11, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8662, at 7843.
63. Case 76/81, 1982 E.C.R. 417, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8812.
64. Id. at 426, 6-7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8812, at 7650.
65. Case 279/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 3322-23, 6-11, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8784, at 7330-31.
66. Case 251/83, 1984 E.C.R. 4277, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,135.
67. Id. at 4294 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
68. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 17.
69. Id. art. 48, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 21-22, 298 U.N.T.S. at 36.
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which Article 59 is not restricted to public law acts. Addition-
ally, although the Court did not respond explicitly to the ques-
tion raised by the Advocate General, the judgment can be read
to confirm his argument. This reading would imply that Arti-
cle 48 and not 59 would be relevant if a person, working in
another EEC country or providing services there, was disad-
vantaged in his activities by an insurer, as compared to persons
in the same situation at home. Article 59 may not, however,
accord a right to the potential receiver of services against a
provider. The problems just raised resemble to some extent
the questions that arose in Sacchi.
Luisi and Carbone7o concerned fines imposed on Italian na-
tionals for exporting currency into other EEC countries. Both
plaintiffs invoked Articles 59, 60, and 106, 7l the latter obliging
the Member States to authorize payments connected with the
movement of goods, services, and capital, to the extent that
this movement is liberalized pursuant to the EEC Treaty.72
One plaintiff maintained that she had exported currency to pay
for medical treatment in another country, and both argued that
they were traveling in another EEC country as tourists, and re-
ceiving services there. According to the Court, tourists, per-
sons receiving medical treatment, and persons traveling for the
purpose of education or business are to be regarded as recipi-
ents of services. This conclusion means that all these services,
contrary to Advocate General Trabucchi,73 are subject to Arti-
cle 59. Payments are liberalized by Article 106 insofar as they
are necessary for services. 4
70. Luisi and Carbone, 1984 E.C.R. at 397-98, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,038.
71. Id. at 403, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038, at 14,606.
72. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 106, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 39-40, 298
U.N.T.S. at 56.
73. Watson, 1976 E.C.R. at 1203-04, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8368, at 7683
(Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi).
74. Luisi and Carbone, 1984 E.C.R. at 408, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038,
at 14,608-09.
All cases reported so far have been referred to the Court by national courts pur-
suant to Article 177. There are only four recent cases where the Commission insti-
gated procedures against Member States under Article 168 for violation of freedom
of service. In these cases the Court found that insurance as well as coinsurance is a
service within the meaning of the EEC Treaty. Commission v. Germany, Case
205/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339; Commission v. French
Republic, Case 220/83, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,340; Com-
mission v. Denmark, Case 252/83, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
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Our reading of Haug-Adrion, therefore, must be revised.
Freedom of services creates a right for receivers to the extent
that they must have access to competing providers of services
in all EEC countries. Haug-Adrion must be understood as ex-
cluding from Article 59 the receiver's right not to be discrimi-
nated against by one and the same provider of services. Pro-
tection in this case can be granted only by other freedoms of
the receivers.
2. Conclusions
a. Importance of Freedom of Services
This overview of the cases confirms what could be de-
duced from the legislative history. Article 60, defining the
services that have been liberalized in the EEC, includes a vari-
ety of activities. This articulation by the Treaty requires both
differentiation of activities through legislation (directives), and
the careful direct application of the Articles to Member State
laws. The case law teaches us that freedom of services is not
relevant when trade has been liberalized by other Treaty provi-
sions. However, wherever other provisions do not apply, Arti-
cle 59 comes in and guarantees that no economic activity is
excluded from the Common Market jurisdiction. As the court
said in Webb, "[a]ccording to the wording of the first paragraph
of Article 60... the expression 'services' means services which
are normally provided for remuneration, insofar as they are
not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of move-
ments for goods, capital and persons."75
b. Only Economy?
The sports cases teach a most important lesson whose rel-
evance extends far beyond Article 59. According to Article 2,
the EEC is an economic community only. Arguments could be
made that state administration, defense, sports, theater, and
television are not parts of the economy and, therefore, not
governed by EEC law, remaining within Member State jurisdic-
tion. But the cases show that 'economy,' for the purposes of
Community law, must be defined according to the special pro-
14,341; Commission v. Ireland, Case 206/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,342.
75. Webb, 1981 E.C.R. at 3322, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784, at 7331.
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visions of the Treaty. Hence, services are subject to the Treaty
if they are provided for remuneration and thereby fulfill the
conditions of Article 60(1). Paragraph 2 adds examples but
does not exclude further activities. The result is that sport or
cultural life is not in toto regulated by Community law, but only
insofar as services are provided for remuneration. And again,
these services are not regulated in toto, but only insofar as regu-
lation is necessary for liberalization. The same rule applies for
Article 48.
3. No Exceptions
The special nature of a particular service will not remove
the service from the coverage of Article 59. The Court in Webb
rejected such an argument by the French government, af-
firming van Binsbergen.76
C. Interstate Trade, Movement of Persons, and Rights of Receivers
1. Domestic Cases
According to Article 59(1) freedom of services is granted
for cases where provider and receiver reside in different coun-
tries, so that we can speak of interstate trade.
In the German insurance case, the Court left open the
question whether Article 59 could be invoked where only the
risk is located in another country.7 7
In Debauve, the Court said, without reference to Article
59(1), that the Treaty provisions on freedom to provide serv-
ices cannot apply to activities whose relevant elements are con-
fined in a single Member State.78 In Koestler the Court went far
in finding that there is an interstate case when the person re-
ceiving the services has taken up residence in another Member
State before the termination of the relations between the par-
ties. 79 Article 59, therefore, is not excluded merely because
76. Id. at 3323, 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784, at 7331.
77. Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, 23, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,339, at 17,157.
78. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 855, 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8661, at
7827-28.
79. Koestler, 1978 E.C.R. at 1980, 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8514, at
7310.
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both parties are residents of the same country at the time when
a contract is concluded.
2. Concentration of Supply to One Country
The German insurance case has confirmed a rule of van
Binsbergen, excluding Article 59 in cases where the supplier di-
rects the services entirely or principally towards the territory of
one other Member State and invokes Article 59 so as to avoid
the professional rules of conduct of the latter state.80 The
Court indicated that the rules on freedom of establishment
may then apply. This application will have to be discussed
when the relation between Articles 52 and 59 is treated.8 One
should keep in mind from the very outset that the Court ex-
cludes Article 59 in those cases, though its conditions are ful-
filled: provider and receiver resident in different countries.
3. Three Types of Services
There was never any doubt that services are within the
reach of Article 59(1) if they are supplied in any one of three
ways: first, the provider may come to the country of the re-
ceiver; second, the receiver may come to the supplier, such as
a doctor or possibly to a hotel in another country; or third,
services can be provided without receiver or supplier physi-
cally moving.8 2 This is the case, for instance, where a customer
calls a bank in another country and asks it to carry out a trans-
action. Yet problems have arisen when free movement of per-
sons has been questioned.
4. Free Movement of Persons
Freedom of movement is necessary for two types of serv-
ices just described.
a. Directives
It will have to be shown later how the Community, by en-
acting directives, implemented free movement of persons.
Here it must be stressed that in the field of services, free move-
80. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at -, 22, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,339, at 17,132.
81. See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
82. Vignes, Elablissement et Services, in 3 J. MWGRET, supra note 11, at 110.
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ment has been granted not only to suppliers, but also to receiv-
ers of services.83
b. Treaty provisions
Problems have arisen because Article 60(3) expressly au-
thorizes suppliers of services to pursue their activities in the
state where the service is rendered. But there is no equivalent
authorization in the Treaty for free movement of the receiver.
The Court has considered this disparity in Luisi and Carbone. 4
In that case, two Italians were involved, both moving into
other EEC countries, carrying currency in contravention of
Italian law. They invoked Articles 59 and 106, the latter grant-
ing freedom of payments, amongst others, for services. The
decision hinged on the question whether the receivers were
entitled by the Treaty to move into other countries as receivers
of services. Advocate General Trabucchi had expressed
doubts in another case.85 The Court referred to the directives
and the programs and concluded: "It follows that the freedom
to provide services includes the freedom, for the recipients of
the services, to go to another Member State in order to receive
a service there .... 86
A commentary would be appropriate with respect to the
reference that the Court makes to the program.8 ' The Court's
statement, as quoted here, refers to the Treaty itself. It does
not derive the right of the recipients from the program. This
thinking is correct, because, once again, this program has no
direct effect. Yet the program has been used by the Court as
an argument for the interpretation of the Treaty. This argu-
ment is certainly permissible within the rules governing the in-
terpretation of the Treaty. However, there remains the ques-
tion of whether freedom of services constitutes a right for re-
cipients of services as well.
83. Council Directive No. 73/148, art. 1(1), O.J. L 172/14 (1973).
84. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro,Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83,
1984 E.C.R. 377, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038.
85. Watson and Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. at 1203, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8368, at 7683.
86. Luisi and Carbone, 1984 E.C.R. at 403, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,038, at 14,606.
87. Id. at 401, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038, at 14,605.
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5. Right of Receivers
a. Doubts as to Receivers' Rights
Article 59(1) mentions only the right to provide services,
and Advocate General Lenz, in Haug-Adrion, has denied rights
of receivers.88 In Luisi and Carbone, Advocate General Mancini
argued to the contrary.8 9 This question involves problems that
are of major importance for the Community.
b. Community Law Before National Courts
Direct effect of Community law was devised by the Court
in cases pending before national courts; Community law would
take precedence over state law and create rights for the benefit
of individuals.90 This formula does not indicate anything as to
the substance of such rights. Luisi and Carbone implies that the
receiver of services can rely on Community law before national
courts, if he wants to have access to the services provided in
other EEC countries. This brings us to the question of free
choice.
c. Free Choice
Luisi and Carbone may imply that, by granting freedoms, the
EEC Treaty will enable producers and suppliers to make deliv-
ery or provide services in other states. The Treaty may envi-
sion also that consumers have a right to choose between differ-
ent offers from different countries. The question is far from
theoretical. It comes up whenever importing states impose
quality standards on goods or, in the form of compulsory con-
ditions, on insurance contracts. Do not buyers of goods or re-
ceivers of services have a right of their own to choose among
different standards and qualities from different countries?
Here, as with restrictions imposed on buyers and receiv-
ers, we come to the substance of Community law. According
to Mr. Justice Everling, the Court's judgment on German qual-
ity standards for beer, in which the Court largely condemned
88. Haug-Adrion, 1984 E.C.R. at 4294, 8 (Opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
89. 1984 E.C.R. at 415, 5 (Opinion of Advocate General Mancini).
90. van Binsbergen repeats the question submitted to the Court "whether the first
paragraph of Article 59 and the third paragraph of Article 60 of the EEC Treaty are
directly applicable and create individual rights which national courts must protect."
1974 E.C.R. at 1310, 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8282, at 7212.
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compulsory standards, may benefit consumers by opening the
door for a choice between beers from different countries. 9'
The case law with respect to free movement of goods permits
imposition of quality standards by importing states only within
strict limits. The case law does not permit such application
where sufficient protection of consumers can be achieved, for
instance, by information. This is a way in which consumer pro-
tection can be combined with a freedom of choice. Under Arti-
cle 30, one is therefore tempted to conclude that the law in-
cludes a right of buyers to choose. Luisi and Carbone could be a
first step toward recognizing an equivalent right of receivers in
the field of services.
However, the Gravier judgment 92 may cause one to hesi-
tate in concluding that there is a right to choose. In that case,
a French student had applied for admission to a Belgian uni-
versity, where she was charged an enrollment fee that Belgian
students were not required to pay. The Court applied Article
7, condemning discrimination on the ground of nationality. It
did not even mention Articles 59-66. Did the Court thereby
deny the existence of receivers' rights? The non-application of
Article 59 may, however, be explained otherwise. The Court
could have been in doubt whether there is a service normally
provided for remuneration when only foreigners have to pay
fees.93 This could have induced the Court to rely on Article 7
instead of Article 59.
D. Freedoms of Establishment and of Services
1. Services Through Establishment
In two cases, the Court has indicated that services may be
supplied via an establishment that the provider has created in
the country ad quem. In one case, an antitrust action concern-
91. The lecture, given at Bitburg on April 24, 1987, will be published soon
[hereinafter Everling Lecture].
92. Gravier v. City of Libge, Case 293/83, 1985 E.C.R. 593, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,152.
93. Id. at 607, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,152, at 15,865. General
Advocate Sir Gordon Slynn has made the point in his conclusions that plaintiff as well
as the Commission invoked Article 59, but that the Court could evade the question
because it could rely on Article 128. The General Advocate himself expresses doubts
as to Article 59. Id. at 597-98 (Opinion of Advocate General Slynn). It could also be
inferred that Article 59 does not include the receiver's right not to be discriminated
against by one and the same supplier of services.
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ing fire insurance in Germany, an association had addressed
recommendations to all members, including subsidiaries of
foreign insurers. 94 Under Article 85(1) the question arose
whether such recommendations could bear on trade between
Member States. The Court accepted that they could, assuming
that activities of the subsidiaries would affect the mother com-
panies.
The next case dealt with different French taxes for differ-
ent forms of establishment.95 The Court relied on Article
52(1), according to which freedom of establishment applies
also to the setting up of agencies, branches, or subsidiaries.
The Court deduced that each enterprise has the freedom to
choose between these forms of establishment in order to do
business in another country. Imposing different taxes could
impair this freedom. One can conclude that the Court under-
stands establishments to be instruments of providing services
in another state.
2. Reasons for Delimitation
There is, however, an important reason to distinguish be-
tween freedom of establishment and freedom of services. In
its judgment in Bulo and Bonivento,96 the Court confirmed, even
if only by interpreting a directive, what normally is deduced
from Article 52(2): that the establishment as well as its activi-
ties may be subjected to all rules of the country where it is set
up. Thus, insurers and banks must obey the rules of the state
in which the subsidiary is set up concerning general condi-
tions, financial status, and the like.
The situation is different for services. In Webb97 and in the
German insurance case 98 the Court was confronted with Arti-
cle 60(3) which provides:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating
94. Verband der Sachversicherer v. Commission, Judgment of Jan. 27, 1987,
Case 45/85, 1987 E.C.R. -.
95. Commission v. France, Case 270/83, 1986 E.C.R. 273, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,282.
96. Bullo and Bonivento, Judgment ofJan. 22, 1987, Case 166/85, 1987 E.C.R.
97. Webb, 1981 E.C.R. at 3327, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784, at 7333.
98. Commission v. Germany, Case 203/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,339.
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to the right of establishment, the person providing a service
may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the
State where the service is provided, under the same condi-
tions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.99
Governments had contended that this rule implies a general
principle according to which even services are subjected to the
law of the state ad quem. This principle was refuted by the
Court in the German insurance case, which found, as did the
the Commission, that Article 60(3) aims principally at facilitat-
ing the provision of services by granting a right to move tem-
porarily into the state ad quem.
However, it does not follow from that paragraph that all na-
tional legislation applicable to nationals of that State and
usually applied to the permanent activities of undertakings
established therein may be similarly applied in its entirety to
the temporary activities of undertakings which are estab-
lished in other Member States. 00
From this statement it follows that services are privileged be-
cause they are partially exempt from the law of the state ad
quem. The provider can offer his product under home stan-
dards in competition with competitors domiciled in the state ad
quem. The Court has yet to explain which rules of the state ad
quem may be excluded, but an argument afortiori leads to the
conclusion that the state ad quem is even less justified in impos-
ing all its rules on imported services, where the provider does
remain in the state a quo. It is obvious that in this situation,
much importance accrues to the delimitation of freedoms of
establishment and of services.
3. Court v. Commission
In the insurance cases the Commission contended that
freedoms of establishment and of services do not exclude each
other. 0 1 A bank or an insurer, having set up an establishment
99. Id. 26.
100. Id. 26.
101. See Commission v. Germany, Case 203/84, 1986 E.C.R. at -, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339. See also supra note 77 and accompanying text. There have
been quite a number of comments on the insurance judgments. See, e.g., H.-P.
SCHWINTOWSKI, DER PRIVATE VERSICHERUNGESVERTRAG ZWISCHEN RECHT UND MARKT
262, 288 (1987); Angerer, Aufsichtsrechtliche Ausgangspunkte der Dienstleistungsfreiheit fii
Vlersicherungsunternehmen im Gemeinsamen Markt, 38 VERSICHE.RUNGSRECHT 325 (1987);
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in the state ad quem, should nevertheless be entitled to invoke
freedom of services, if its service is provided from the state a
quo and the establishment is acting only in other fields or only
as an intermediary.
The Court seems to refute this idea, because it acknowl-
edges
that an insurance undertaking of another Member State
which maintains a permanent presence in the Member State
in question comes within the scope of the provisions of the
Treaty on the right of establishment, even if that presence
does not take the form of a branch or agency, but consists
merely of an office managed by the undertaking's own staff
or by a person who is independent but authorized to act on
a permanent basis for the undertaking, as would be the case
with an agency .... [s]uch an insurer could not avail itself of
Articles 59 and 60 with regard to its activities .... 02
A narrow interpretation of this dictum could reduce free-
dom of services to a dead letter. A broadcasting station that
maintains a permanent representation in another state for the
purpose of collecting information could not avail itself of Arti-
cles 59 and 60 for its broadcasting activities. It is hard to be-
lieve that the Court wanted to exclude freedom of services for
such cases after having granted it to providers of television,
without even considering that normally broadcasting stations
of some importance do maintain some representation in the
country ad quem. And it would be hard to understand why the
Court took pains to discuss quite a number of subtleties of
freedom of services in its judgment if it were necessary to pre-
Berr & Groutel, Droit europeen des assurances: Libertideprestation de Services et Coassurance,
23 REV. TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPfEN 83 (1987); Borgesius, Het Verzekerings-
Archief, DEEL 64-1987-2, 109; Edwards, Establishment and Services: An Analysis of the
Insurance Cases, 12 EUR. L. REV. 231 (1987); Goujet, Europdiischer Versicherungsmarkt,
1987 DIE VERSICHERUNGSPRAXIS 17 (1987); Hiibner, 42JURISTENZEITUNG 330 (1987);
Schmidt, Europische Gemeinschaft-Zur Dienstleistungsfreiheit du Versicherungsanteruchmen,
42 DIE VERSICHERUNGS-RUNDSCHAU 201 (1987).
102. Commission v. Germany, Case 203/84, 1986 E.C.R. at -, 21, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339, at-. Vignes had written: "Mais le prestataire de services
ne doit pas avoir un 6tablissement dans le pays ou il op~re, sinon son activit6 rel~ver-
ait de l'tablissement secondaire." Vignes, Etablissement et Services, inJ. MCGRET, supra
note 11, at 111. ("But the provider of services need not have an establishment in the
country in which he operates, otherwise his activity will be considered a secondary
establishment.") He does not consider the case where de facto the services come
from the State a quo. See id.
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suppose that there are almost no occasions in which freedom
of services could be invoked. An alternative interpretation,
therefore, would be that freedom of services is excluded only
insofar as services are provided by an establishment or any
permanent representative in the state ad quem. Further alterna-
tives could be imagined.
If, however, the narrow interpretation should prevail,
freedom of services will mean very little. For an insurer, this
freedom could remain relevant where he acts only by corre-
spondence or modern ways of telecommunication or through
independent brokers, who take care of the interests of their
clients in choosing between competing insurers instead of
working permanently for one specific insurer and representing
his interests.
4. Other Limitations for Article 59
Even if the narrow interpretation were eliminated, the sky
of services is not bright. There are two other limitations.
a. Permanent activities excluded?
We have quoted from the judgment with respect to Article
60(3). The Court speaks of permanent activities of undertak-
ings established in the state ad quem, which are distinguished
from services within the scope of Article 59. On the one hand,
this formula may be in accordance with the alternative inter-
pretation, which excludes Article 59 only where a service is
provided by an establishment. On the other hand, it could in-
dicate that freedom of services is for the benefit of those cases
only where the provider temporarily supplies another country.
This was the French position in the insurance cases. But such
a narrow interpretation, again, must be questioned. The Sin-
gle European Act, entered into force onJuly 1, 1987, has intro-
duced a new Article, Article 8a, into the EEC Treaty, according
to which the common market has to be an internal market
without frontiers. Enterprises doing business in such a market
may sell more intensively here than there. But it would seem
to be a rather artificial delimitation if, in an internal market,
legal consequences would depend on whether a provider acts
permanently in a national part of that market.
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b. Concentration on a National Market
In confirming its van Binsbergen judgment, the Court found
in the German insurance case that an insurer cannot avail itself
of freedom of services, if its activity is entirely or principally
directed towards the territory of one other Member State and if
it acts from outside for the purpose of avoiding the profes-
sional rules of conduct of the state ad quem.' 0 3 This could be
questioned again, because the future existence of separate
markets is assumed. No matter whether this argument is ac-
cepted, such dictum will probably be relevant only in rare
cases. Perhaps it could be an argument in broadcasting cases,
where a French or Dutch station broadcasts specifically in the
German language to penetrate the German market. If the Eu-
ropean Court would follow the approach of the United States
Supreme Court in New Hampshire v. Piper,'°4 the dictum could
become meaningless because it seems that according to this
case, the purpose-avoiding the laws of the state ad quem-may
not be presumed. One must ask, however, whether European
judges are less prepared to accept that professionals as well as
businessmen are normally law-abiding people. Comparative
research should undertake such questions.
5. Single Market and Legal Psychology
The Court may in the future decide on the basis of specific
arguments that have been developed. The gist of the problem,
however, is to be found elsewhere. If the scope of freedom of
services is interpreted narrowly, providers of services will have
to set up establishments in all the states in which they want to
provide services. There is a freedom of establishment that
may, in the field of banking, go further than American law. Yet
freedom of establishment under European law implies that
services have to be subjected to the law of the state of the es-
tablishment. A provider of services could not offer a product,
such as insurance, construed under the law of his home state.
Also, consumers would be deprived of what a single market
should grant them: the choice between different products,
each obeying the rules of the state a quo. If the Court wants to
103. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at -, 22, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,339 at 17,132.
104. 470 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985).
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open the door for such a choice to consumers, then the scope
for freedom of services must be widened and not interpreted
narrowly.
One is tempted to point to a psychological problem of the
Court. The Justices come from all the Member States, and one
could imagine that each Justice is convinced that the legal sys-
tem of his home state guarantees sufficient quality of goods
and services, and that the system of education of his home
state permits him to rely on the professional qualifications of
his countrymen. That could induce the Justices to broaden the
scope of freedom of services in asking each state ad quem to
have confidence in services provided from other states or their
nationals. It would not be necessary any more to impose all
the law of the state ad quem, as it would be the case if the Court
insists that, for instance, each permanent representative of a
foreign provider exclude the provider's possibility to avail him-
self of freedom of services.
Instead, it may be said with all due respect that the Justices
of the Court seem to form an alliance of mistrust, each insist-
ing that for imported services the law of the state ad quem
should govern and that, for that purpose, freedom of services
should be construed narrowly in favor of a broader recurrence
to freedom of establishment.
E. The Substance of Freedom of Services
1. Introduction
The cases in this part can be divided into two groups. The
first group includes cases from 1974 to 1984, which have two
things in common: they were decided under the procedure of
Article 177, and therefore give an interpretation of freedom of
services in answering questions referred to the Court by na-
tional courts. The finding of facts and the final decision were
within the jurisdiction of national courts, and their judgments
are accessible only exceptionally and with difficulties. These
cases also used formulas that have been bypassed by the sec-
ond group, and may therefore be neglected.
The second group comprises the four insurance cases de-
cided at the end of 1986.105 In these cases, the Commission
105. See supra note 74.
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brought action under article 169.106 These decisions made a
step forward in the law of services.
2. 1974 - 1984
a. Monopolies
Two judgments permit the conclusion that state monopo-
lies of certain services, such as broadcasting and artificial in-
semination of cattle, are compatible with Article 59. 107
b. Payment and Movement
Freedom of payment and of movement for the purpose of
supplying services has been confirmed by the Court. 0 8 Cer-
tain regulations of the state ad quem are permitted by the Court.
c. Discriminations
Debauve decided that Articles 59 and 60
do not preclude national rules prohibiting the transmission
of advertisements by cable television-as they prohibit the
broadcasting of advertisements by television-if those rules
are applied without distinction as regards the origin,
whether national or foreign, of those advertisements, the
nationality of the person providing the service, or the place
where he is established.' 0 9
This is the law in the absence of any harmonization of the rele-
vant rules. And the Court starts from the premise that the
"strict requirements [of Article 59] ... involve the abolition of
discrimination against a provider of services on the grounds of
his nationality or of the fact that he is established in a Member
State other than that where the service is provided." 11 0 Article
59 is used in these cases only against discrimination directed
106. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 56-57, 298
U.N.T.S. at 75.
107. Socit6 Coop6rative d'Am6lioration de I'Elevage et d'Ins6mination Ar-
tificielle du Barn v. Mialocq, Case 271/81, 1983 E.C.R. 2057, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,035; Sacchi, Case 155/73, 1974 E.C.R. 409, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8267.
108. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038.
109. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 857, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8661, at
7829.
110. Id. at 856, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8661, at 7828.
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against foreign providers of services. Under these rules, insur-
ance for kidnapping could be forbidden and insurance con-
tracts for kidnapping could be declared void. The Koestler
case"' fits in this paradigm. In that case the Court upheld a
rule of German law, according to which specific contracts, in-.
cluding speculative contracts, are unenforceable against par-
ties who are not businessmen. This rule may be applied
against a foreign bank as long as it does not discriminate, even
though the law obviously creates an obstacle for the business
of brokers or banks. But Article 59 could be violated if the
German rule were applied in a discriminatory way, for exam-
ple, only to bargains with foreign banks or brokers. The sports
cases show that exclusion of foreigners, such as by discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality, cannot be permitted under Ar-
ticle 59.112
d. Establishment and Authorization
The majority of cases deals with the question whether Ar-
ticle 59 excludes national provisions that impose on foreigners
the duty to have an establishment or residence in the state ad
quem or to have an authorization to do business there. The
Court accepts that this requirement is a burden for the provid-
ers within the scope of Article 59. Above all, freedom of serv-
ices could be reduced to zero, because the necessity of an es-
tablishment would create a situation where only freedom of es-
tablishment is available." 3 The Court states no per se rule,
but demands a weighing of all interests involved. In rare in-
stances, the Court may demand an establishment when a legal
(or other) representative must always be available for contact
with the Courts.' 14 A license may be needed in the state ad
quem where it is necessary in sensitive areas to allow the exer-
cise of administrative control over the provider,1 5 but only in-
111. Soci~te G~nrale Alsacienne de Banque v. Koestler, 1978 E.C.R. 1971,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8514.
112. See D6na v. Mantero, Case 13/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8290; Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/74, 1974 E.C.R.
1405, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8290.
113. See Transporoute, 1982 E.C.R. at 427-28, 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8812, at 7650.
114. van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. at 1310, 14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8282, at 7211.
115. See Webb, 1981 E.C.R. at 3325, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784, at
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sofar as the state a quo does not wield an equivalent control,
and there do exist specific laws in the state ad quem, the en-
forcement of which must be secured. This situation is the Eu-
ropean equivalent of New Hampshire v. Piper. One detail should
be considered: when the Court refers to equivalent control in
other States, it does so in procedures where it sends the case
back to the national court for fact-finding. It does not discuss
how, for example, a court or tribunal in Belgium or the
Netherlands could find out how effective controls are exercised
in Greece or Portugal.
For the most part, we have to deal here with cases where
there is no clear discrimination. Those cases, however, do
concern obstacles for interstate services because the providers
of services involved who attempted to extend their activities,
had first to create establishments and procure a license in all
states concerned, without success. Their start was made more
difficult, especially for smaller enterprises and professions, be-
cause the creation of an establishment in another country and
application for an authorization there forces them to incur
costs that they may be unable to recover. One must acknowl-
edge that the Court finds a restriction of freedom of services
here and demands that states must at least justify the necessity
of the rules imposed on providers of services.
e. Restriction and Justification
We may be able to undertand these cases if two questions
are distinguished for the purposes of Article 59. First, we have
to ascertain whether a rule of national law imposes burdens on
interstate services. If so, the second question is whether such
restrictions can be justified in order to escape Article 59. Dis-
criminations can never be justified. Beyond discrimination,
the criteria for answering the second question have already
been indicated" 6 but will be explored fully below. Certainly,
Community law cannot demand from Member States a justifi-
cation of all their law. It is necessary, therefore, to construe
somewhat narrowly those restrictions within the meaning of
•7332; Van Wesemael, 1979 E.C.R. at 52-53, 29-30, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8533, at 7657.
116. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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Article 59 that are forbidden, if notjustified. The Court did so
in van Binsbergen, where we read:
The restrictions to be abolished pursuant to Articles 59 and
60 include all requirements imposed on the person provid-
ing the service by reason in particular of his nationality or of
the fact that he does not habitually reside in the State where
the service is provided, which do not apply to persons es-
tablished within the national territory or which may prevent
or otherwise obstruct the activities of the person providing
the service. 117
The Court becomes more reluctant, however, when defining
what direct effect of Article 59 means:
The provisions of that article [Article 59] abolish all dis-
crimination against the person providing the service by rea-
son of his nationality or of the fact that he is established in a
Member State other than that in which the service is to be
provided. 11 8
This holding articulates a narrow delimitation of restrictions
within the meaning of Article 59. Neither the Belgian prohibi-
tions on advertising in television, nor the German rule dis-
cussed in Koestler is caught by this dictum, and it is therefore
easy to understand why the Court did not deem it necessary
for the governments to justify their respective law. The insur-
ance cases may, however, have changed the picture.
3. The Court's New Approach
a. Impact of Article 30
The van Binsbergen case was decided before Cassis de Di-
jon, 119 which has become the leading case for restrictions on
the free movement of goods. This may provide an explanation
for the fact that the Court, for purposes of Article 59, did not
turn to formulas used in the interpretation of Article 30. In
the insurance cases, for which the German case may.be taken
as example, the Commission, however, invited the Court to
adapt the criteria of Article 59 to those used for Article 30. For
this purpose, the Commission referred to Rau v. de Smedt,
117. 1974 E.C.R. at 1309, 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8282, at 7211.
118. Id. at 1311, 25, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8282, at 7212.
119. Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein, Case 120/78, 1979
E.C.R. 649, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543.
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where the Court confirmed its jurisprudence as to Article
30.120
First, Community law is already violated if there is no dis-
crimination against foreign goods and if interstate trade is not
excluded or barred but merely rendered more expensive or
difficult. And second, the Court implicitly overruled Commis-
sion v. Italy,1 2 ' decided one year earlier, where different func-
tions were attributed to the interdiction of restrictions con-
tained in Article 30 and approximation of laws under Article
100.122 This second point will be discussed below. Here it is
sufficient to emphasize that even the existence of differences
among the laws of Member States can create a restriction on
interstate trade, which must be evaluated under Article 30.
b. The Court's New Rule as to Services
It may be suggested that in the German insurance case,1 23
the Court transferred some of the criteria of Rau v. de Smedt to
Article 59 and thereby extended what Article 59 reaches as a
restriction of services. The Court noted that:
[a]ccording to the well-established case-law of the Court,
120. The Court in Rau v. de Smedt noted that
... in the absence of common rules relating to the marketing of the prod-
ucts concerned, obstacles to free movement within the Community resulting
from disparities between the national laws must be accepted in so far as such
rules, applicable to domestic and to imported products without distinction,
may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory require-
ments relating inter alia to consumer protection. It is also necessary for such
rules to be proportionate to the aim in view. If a Member State has a choice
between various measures to attain the same objective it should choose the
means which least restricts the free movement of goods.
[T]he requirement that a particular form of packaging must also be
used for imported goods is not an absolute barrier to the importation into
the Member State concerned of products originating in other Member
States, nevertheless it is of such a nature as to render the marketing of those
products more difficult or more expensive ......
Rau v. de Smedt, Case 261/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3961, 3972-73, 12-13, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8879, at 8352; see also Robertson, Case 220/81, 1982 E.C.R. 2349,
2360, 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8851, at 8027.
121. Commission v. Italy, Case 193/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3019, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8788. The Robertson judgment may be interpreted as having overruled Com-
mission v. Italy.
122. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 100, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 37-38, 298
U.N.T.S. at 54.
123. Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, -, 25, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339, at 17,158.
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Articles 59 and 60 . . . became directly applicable . . . and
their applicablity was not conditional on the harmonization
or the coordination of the laws of the Member States.
Those articles require the removal not only of all discrimi-
nation against a provider of a service on the grounds of his
nationality but also all restrictions on his freedom to pro-
vide services means he is established in a Member State
other than that in which the service is to be provided.' 2 4
As to restrictions, the Court resumes its van Binsbergen
formula but it extends direct effect beyond van Binsbergen to
State measures or rules that are imposed because the provider
of services is not established in the State ad quem. The Court
then deals with the German requirement that a foreign insurer
authorized by and under the supervision of the authority of the
State a quo must have a permanent establishment and dispose
of a separate authorization in the state ad quem. These require-
ments, according to the Court,
constitute restrictions on the freedom to provide services
inasmuch as they increase the cost of such services in the
State in which they are provided, in particular where the in-
surer conducts business in that State only occasionally.' 25
By referring to the costs imposed on the foreign provider,
the Court approaches even more the dictum in Rau v. de Smedt
and opens the door for inclusion into the restrictions within
the meaning of Article 59 of all State measures influencing the
costs of the provider. I suggest that in this respect the defini-
tion as well as the delimitation of "restrictions" within the
scope of Article 59 is open. While the old cases barred dis-
crimination only, the reach of Article 59 has been immensely
broadened, making it necessary for the Court to ask for justifi-
cation of such state measures which may be necessary for the
public good.
With a view to potential justification, the Court rules that
the requirement of a permanent establishment cannot bejusti-
fied because this would exclude freedom of services completely
and must not be allowed for purposes of administrative con-
trol. The requirement of a prior authorization was, on the
other hand, approved insofar as necessary for consumer pro-
124. Id.
125. Id. at -, 28, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339 at 17,158.
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tection. The Court holds that state law on supervision has not
yet been sufficiently harmonized and that the Commission has
not yet shown that less restrictive means of safeguarding con-
sumer interests are available for the states. The Court rules
out, however, every possibility of justifying a requirement of
prior authorization for leading insurers in cases of co-insur-
ance. A directive has already provided that the non leading co-
insurers need be neither established, nor authorized in the
state ad quem. 1 26 Since the leading insurer can participate in
co-insurance with a minimum quota, his subjection under the
supervision of the state ad quem could not really contribute to
the protection of the insured and, therefore, would not be pro-
portionate. Beyond that, two particular problems must be
highlighted.
In basing justification of a separate authorization on con-
sumer protection, the Court deviated from insurance law in
some Member States, where further reasons are given for in-
surance supervision. However, in safeguarding consumer in-
terests, the Court again followed the cases dealing with free
movement of goods. Rau v. de Smedt 127 had referred expressly
to consumer protection. The Court has indicated1 28 that the
requirement of separate authorization is not, to quote Rau v. de
Smedt, a mandatory requirement, where the insured are busi-
nessmen and not consumers. The Court could not yet decide
so because the Commission had not submitted a proposal for
the delimitation before the Court. There is no risk at this
point in providing commercial insurance without prior author-
ization in the state ad quem if the insurer has no permanent rep-
resentation in that country.
When dealing with the question of whether additional
control in the state ad quem is necessary, the Court repeated its
rule that there is no necessity where equivalent control exists
in the state a quo. The Court was able to avoid the difficult
question of whether control in other countries is equivalent to
German law because the Commission had not raised that
point. Had it been raised, the Court could have been forced to
126. Council Directive No. 73/239, O.J. L 228/3 (1973), 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1349.35.
127. Rau v. de Smedt, 1982 E.C.R. 3961, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8879.
128. See Lecture, supra note 91 for further discussion of this point.
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assess not only the legal and administrative rules of the Mem-
ber States, but also the effectiveness of their enforcement.
New horizons for comparative research show up in that con-
text.
The Commission may have hesitated to raise that point for
a peculiar reason that has apparently not been considered in
legal publications. If one follows the Court in not permitting
additional control in the state ad quem, where there is sufficient
control in the states a quo, the result would be a situation where
equivalent control exists in some Member States and is lacking
in others. This disparity would lead to a split of control: prov-
iders from some countries would have to suffer control in the
state ad quem, while others would not. This question was never
raised in the cases discussed above. Caution will be necessary
to avoid such a split.
c. Conclusion
First, the range of restrictions to be evaluated under Arti-
cle 59 has been widened. All state measures that create costs
for the provider of services, as well as those that discriminate
against the provider, thereby burdening interstate services, are
now included. Still, provisions such as those in Debauve or
Koestler are not to be treated as restrictions as long as there is
no discrimination. No justification is necessary here. It cannot
be ruled out that future case law, following the interpretation
of Article 30, will extend Article 59 even further. This exten-
sion would create new difficulties for the delimitation of such
cases, where there is no need of justification.
Second, the justification formula of the insurance case has
roots in van Binsbergen, Webb, and van Wesemael. The Court
spoke of professional rules "justified by the general good"
with regard to the "particular nature of" a service 129 or of
"particularly sensitive matters," where it amounts for the state
ad quem to a legitimate choice of policy, if it controls imported
services. 130 In the insurance case the Court referred in partic-
ular to van Wesenael and concluded that requirements by the
129. Van Wesemael, 1979 E.C.R; at 52, 28, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8533,
at 7666; Van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. at 1310, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8282, at 7211.
130. Webb, 1981 E.C.R. at 3323, 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8784, at
7331.
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state ad quem are justified only "if it is established that in the
field of activity concerned there are imperative reasons relating
to the public interest which justify restrictions."'' This is a
general formula that includes protection of consumers as well
as, for example, employed people or all those who are pro-
tected by the enforcement of professional rules.
By relying on the particular nature of a service or the im-
perative needs the Court may deny justifications, where it is of
the opinion that protective measures are not necessary, such as
for commercial insurance. This would be a judgment follow-
ing policy considerations. Legal considerations are decisive,
where the Court, with regard to the fundamental character of
Article 59,132 admits restrictive state measures only, if there is
no discrimination, if they are necessary for their purpose, pro-
portionate, 33 and above all, if the public interest is not already
protected by rules of the state of establishment.
These are the yardsticks also used by the Court for the
purposes of Article 30. There remains one question: what is
the influence of coordination and approximation on direct ef-
fect?
F. Direct Effect in Its Relation to Approximation and Coordination
1. The Problems
The Court has said that direct effect of Article 59 is in-
dependent of the measures provided for in Article 63.' 31 On
the other hand, the German insurance case shows that direct
effect is restricted where prior approximation of law is not suf-
ficient, that is, in the fields of technical reserves of the insurers
or conditions of insurance.' 3 5 From the cases applying Article
30 it is clear that justification of restrictive measures is ex-
131. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at -, 29, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,339, at 17,158.
132. Id. at-, 27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339, at 17,158 ("fundamen-
tal principle").
133. Id. at-, 29, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339 at 17,158 ("if no less
restrictive means are available").
134. With respect to the essential requirements of Article 59, see Van J1esemael,
1979 E.C.R. at 52, 27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8533, at 7657; see also Commis-
sion v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. at 3033, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8788, at 7364
(discussing purpose of Article 30 as compared with Article 100).
135. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. at-, 38, 40, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,339, at 17,159-60.
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cluded where the Community has regulated by directives or in
another way has occupied the field.' 3 6 Two questions have to
be answered here: is there just a limitation or an extension of
direct effect? Or may there be a distinction between restric-
tions in the sense of Article 59 and other obstacles, which can
be overcome only by approximation and coordination of laws?
2. No Clear Distinction Between Cases of Restriction and
Approximation or Coordination of Laws
a. Movement of Goods
Rau v. de Smedt overruled Commission v. Italy with respect to
the movement of goods.13 7 In that latter case the Court ex-
plained that Articles 30 and 100 have different purposes:
The purpose of Article 30 is, save for certain specific excep-
tions, to abolish in the immediate future all quantitative re-
strictions on the imports of goods and all measures having
an equivalent effect, whereas the general purpose of Article
100 is, by approximating the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative provisions of the Member States, to enable obstacles
of whatever kind arising from disparities between them to
be reduced. 138
By overruling this distinction, the Court in Rau v. de Smedt has
definitely opened the door for extending Article 30 to almost
all state laws and practices that may be a burden on interstate
commerce, for the sole reason that there are disparities among
the laws of the Member States.13 9
b. Services
For services, van Binsbergen created a distinction, not be-
tween Article 59 and approximation of laws, but among direc-
136. Rau, 1982 E.C.R. at 3971, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8879 at 8352
(discussing the absence of common rules and obstacles to free movement).
137. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
138. Commission v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. at 3033, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8788, at 7364.
139. This corresponds to the evaluation by Masclet, Les articles 30, 36 et 100 d
traiti C.E.E. d/a lumiere de l'arrit "cassis de Dyon ", 16 REV. TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUR.
611, 626, 630 (1980). But see Matthies, Beseitigung der mengenmdssigen Baschrdnkungen
zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten art. 30, no. 25, in KOMMENTAR ZuM EWG-VERTRAG (E.
Grabitz looseleaf ed. 1986).
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tives that aim at coordination. 4 ° According to the Court, such
directives have different functions:
the first [purpose] being to abolish, during the transitional
period, restrictions on freedom to provide services, the sec-
ond being to introduce into the law of Member States a set
of provisions intended to facilitate the effective exercise of
this freedom, in particular by the mutual recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications and the coordination of laws with re-
gard to the pursuit of activities as self-employed persons. ' 41
If one takes into account that the first function today is per-
formed by the direct effect of Article 59, this dictum could be
translated into the Court's statement in Commission v. Italy,
drawing a distinction between direct effect abolishing all re-
strictions from the end of the transitory period on, and the
functions to be performed by coordination.
c. Proposition
It is my proposition that the distinctions in Commission v.
Italy as well as those in van Binsbergen are purely academic. The
Court was therefore well advised to neglect them in Rau v. de
Smedt and to open the door for application of Article 30 in situ-
ations where an obstacle for interstate trade exists only in the
form of disparities between national laws. The insurance deci-
sions should be understood as following this analysis in the
field of services. Therefore, we are forced to look for an ade-
quate instrument to delimit Article 59 as well as Article 30.
This instrument consists of policy considerations. 142
3. The Policies
a. No Restrictions
There are cases where no restrictions are found. Koestler
and Debauve may be mentioned as examples. 143 There are
cases with the same result under Article 30.144 The major rea-
sons for excluding state measures from the grip of either Arti-
140. van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. at 1311, 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8282, at 7212.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
143. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. at 855, 8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8514 at
7311; Koeslter, 1978 E.C.R. at 1981, 6, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8514, at 7311.
144. Steindorff, Gemeinsamer Markt als Binnenmarkt, 150 ZEITSCHRIFT F R DAS
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cle 30 or Article 59 are first, that regulation of an activity has
only minor adverse effect on interstate trade, and second, that
the existence of legal rules is self-evident and needs no justifi-
cation. This evaluation starts from the premise that it is the
Member States who have to decide on legal policies as long as
no harmonization or coordination has been effectuated by the
Community. 14 5 This does not exclude that the Community de-
cided on approximation of laws in such cases, as will be dis-
cussed later with respect to commercial agents and the law of
insurance contracts, and as has been the case with product
liabilty.' 46 In such cases, it is argued simply that a uniform law
contributes to the functioning of an internal market.
b. No Direct Effect
There are other cases where state law introduces or main-
tains obstacles to interstate trade and where policy interests of
the state are involved. The German insurance case is a patent
example. The Court quite openly accepts consumer protec-
tion as a justification for a restriction, in the concrete case for
the requirement of prior authorization. Protection of such
state interests is achieved by denying direct effect of Article 59
or by limiting it. The Casati judgment,'4 7 denying direct effect
to Article 67 (free movement of capital),' 48 is mainly based on
artificial grounds. Obviously these grounds serve to camou-
flage policy interests of the Member States.
c. Recognition of Qualifications
It is impossible to develop here all real or potential policy
influences. Recognition of foreign diplomas and qualifications
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 687, 694 (1986) (relying on Mat-
thies, supra note 139).
145. See Steindorff, Problems des Art. 30 EWG-Vertrag, 148 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS
GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 338 (1984).
146. See Commission Directive No. 85/374, O.J. L 210/29 (1985), 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3330.
147. Casati, Case 203/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2595, 2615, 13, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8779, at 7289; see Oliver, Free Movement of Capital Between Member States: Article
67(1) EEC and the Implementing Directives, 9 EUR. L. REV. 401 (1984); Steindorff,
Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit in der EG nach Casati, FESTSCHRIFr FUR WINFRIED WERNER 877
(W. Hadding, U. Immenga, H.-J. Mertens, K. Pleyer & U. Schneider eds. 1984).
148. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 67, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 89, 298
U.N.T.S. at 42.
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may be mentioned. Until now it is reserved for coordination of
laws.
With the exception of the Thieffry case,' 4 9 decided under
Article 52, the requirement of domestic diplomas and qualifi-
cation by the state ad quem has not been attacked as contraven-
ing the direct effect of Article 59. This implies a policy deci-
sion that a state ad quem may impose its law as to the prerequi-
sites of certain activities, such as in the professions, banking, or
in insurance, as long as there is no coordination pursuant to
Article 57. 15' But any court could find that such a requirement
is, for example, not proportionate, because of the demand of a
specific education or qualification. Then the policy considera-
tions could lead to another result. Three ways of arriving at a
judgment may be considered.
First, if one restricts Article 59 to cases of discrimination,
a requirement of qualification along the rules and standards of
the state ad quem cannot be an offense. But since the insurance
judgments, it is obvious that Article 59 reaches beyond dis-
crimination, so that the requirement of domestic qualification
cannot be per se legal.
Second, one may argue that the requirement of qualifica-
tion is self-evident for certain activities and that, therefore, it
must be tolerated unless the requirement imposes an undue
burden on the providers of services. Above all, providers who
intend to supply services into more than one other state will
find that the qualification requirements of every state ad quem
constitute real barriers, which can hardly be overcome, to tran-
sient trade.
This forces us to choose a third approach, following the
insurance judgments, under which Article 59 is directly appli-
cable to qualification requirements. This implies that such re-
quirements are not per se compatible with Article 59, but must
be justified. Amongst others, equivalent qualification in the
state a quo excludes justification. This is one of the main points
where the law of services, influenced by the insurance deci-
sions, may deviate from the law of etablishment in the future.
149. Thieffry v. Conseil de l'ordre des avocats A la Cour de Paris, Case 71/76,
1977 E.C.R. 765, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8396.
150. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 57, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25, 298
U.N.T.S. at 39-40.
1988]
390 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:347
4. Conclusion
It has become obvious that the direct effect of Article 59 is
not limited by any clear-cut rule, according to which, one sort
of restriction is within the scope of Article 59, while other re-
strictions can be dealt with only by coordination or approxima-
tion of laws. Rather, direct effect of Article 59 depends on pol-
icy considerations. Some state laws or measures may be evalu-
ated as not being restricitive, while with respect to others,
direct effect of Article 59 may be restricted. This has nothing
to do with the question of whether obstacles are caused by dis-
parities of national laws or just specific rules of national law.
There remains the question whether justification of state
rules within Article 59 is excluded where the Community has
occupied the field by enacting measures of approximation or
coordination.
G. Providers from Third Countries
1. Nationals
Article 59(1) accords freedom of services only to nationals
of the Member States. This rule may be extended to nationals
of third states by measures provided for in Article 59(2). No
such measure has been enacted.
2. Companies and Firms
Article 58(1), which applies to services according to Arti-
cle 66, provides that companies and firms complying with the
rules of this article are treated in the same way as nationals of
Member States. By establishing (or buying) such a "company
or firm," nationals of third countries can make use of freedom
of services. There is one limit, however. According to the law
of professions, some activities cannot be exercised by compa-
nies. We cannot discuss here whether such state law could
meet with objections.
IV. OTHER FREEDOMS
A. Freedom of Movement for Persons
According to Article 3(c), the activities of the Community
shall include the abolition, as between Member States, of ob-
stacles to freedom of movement for persons. This includes,
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besides services, movement for workers (Article 48) and for
those who want to start or maintain an establishment in an-
other country. This broad impact of freedom of movement
makes it impossible to deal with such a freedom under the aus-
pices of services only. An exhaustive exploration is beyond the
scope of this article.
1. Specific Treaty Provisions
It has been demonstrated above that Article 60(3), in or-
der to implement freedom of movement, authorizes providers
of services to pursue their activity temporarily in the country ad
quem.
2. Jurisprudence
We have learned from the cases that an analogous free-
dom to move for receivers of services must be deduced from
Article 59, though not mentioned expressly. The Watson and
Belmann case teaches a further lesson: The state ad quem may
still demand some formalities from providers or receivers of
services, but not such formalities that would constitute a real
obstacle to freedom of movement for persons.'"' The Court
said that the rules on free movement for persons implement a
fundamental principle and take precedence over any national
rule that might conflict with them. They include the right of
residence.152
If translated into the three categories mentioned above,
rules of control may be self-evident and as such justified ipso
151. Case 118/75, 1976 E.C.R. at 1185, 1197, 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8368, at 7679.
152. Beyond that the Court said:
Community law has not excluded the power of Member States to adopt
measures enabling the national authorities to have an exact knowledge of
population movements affecting their territory.
... the competent authorities . . . may require nationals of the other
Member States to report their presence to the authorities of the State con-
cerned.
Such an obligation could not in itself be regarded as an infringement of
the rules concerning freedom of movement for persons.
However, such an infringement might result from the legal formalities
in question if the control procedures to which they refer were such as to
restrict the freedom of movement ... or to limit the right ... to enter and
reside ... for the purposes intended by Community law.
Id. at 198, 17-18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8368, at 7680.
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iure, if they do not create undue obstacles. In the latter case, if
these rules of control create undue obstacles, they are incom-
patible with freedom of movement for persons, and no justifi-
cation seems to be accepted by the Court within Article 59.
There might be a presumption that they are not proportionate.
3. Community Legislation
Council directives 64/221153 and 73/148154 have imple-
mented freedom of movement for persons. They expressly
mention freedom of receivers. They provide, inter alia, for
rights of family members. They also define and strictly limit
public policy issues that might be used as a justification for re-
fusing a right of free movement to some persons. This refusal
can be based on Articles 66 and 56(1)1 55 of the Treaty, where a
special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public
policy, public security, or public health is permitted. Such per-
mission is construed narrowly by the Court.
B. Freedom of Payments
Freedom of payments is to be derived from Article 106.156
The problems arising in this context have been demonstrated
above, together with Luisi and Carbone.
C. Free Movement of Capital
According to Article 61(2), liberalization of banking and
insurance is linked to free movement of captal.157 In Casati, the
Court denied direct effect to Article 67, which provides for free
movement of capital. The Council has, however, enacted di-
rectives for the implementation of free movement of capital. 158
The Court could rely on this fact in its insurance judgment and
could therefore accord direct effect to Article 59 to insurance
153. Council Directive No. 64/221, O.J. L 64/850 (1964)
154. Council Directive No. 73/148, O.J. L 172/14 (1973).
155. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 56(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 24, 298
U.N.T.S. at 39.
156. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 106, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 39-40, 298
U.N.T.S. at 56.
157. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 61(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 26, 298
U.N.T.S. at 41.
158. See Council Directive No. 63/21, O.J. 62/63 (1963); Council Directive of
May 11, 1960, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 49.
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because free movement of capital has been secured by a direc-
tive. 1
D. Freedom of Establishment
When discussing the delimitation of freedoms of services
and of establishment, we objected to a narrow interpretation of
Article 59. However, the more a narrow interpretation
prevails, the more it will be necessary to rely on freedom of
establishment for the purpose of transient trade in services.
1. The Scope of Article 52
In the German insurance case, the Commission drew the
Court's attention to the fact that according to German law, the
establishment of foreign insurers can be authorized only if they
are capable of handling insurance business independent of the
insurer's main establishment. 60 Such capacity presupposes a
minimum amount of equipment, including qualified personnel.
This may amount to minimum costs per year that the Commis-
sion evaluated as one million German marks. Obviously such a
requirement creates a heavy burden on the freedom of estab-
lishment. It also limits transient trade in services insofar as
they are performed with the help of establishments.
There is a French insurance case dealing with French
taxes' 6 ' that implicitly broadened freedom of establishment.
The Court held that those who want to set up an establishment
in another country are entitled by Article 52(1) to make use of
all forms of establishment that are mentioned therein, includ-
ing agencies. This prohibition bars discriminatory tax regula-
tions that make access to one form of establishment more ex-
pensive than to the other. One must conclude that the Ger-
man requirement, with respect to establishment, is in conflict
with Article 52, because it would de facto exclude the right to
establish mere agencies. Establishment and supply of services
from an establishment are hereby facilitated.
159. Commission v. Germany, 1986 E.C.R. -, -, 19, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,339, at 17,157.
160. 6 GOLDBERG & MOLLER, VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTSGESETZ § 106 (1980).
161. Commission v. France, Case 270/83, 1986 E.C.R. 273, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,282.
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2. Discrimination and Other Obstacles
Once again, Article 52 is principally limited to abolishing
only discrimination, while other burdens on free establishment
caused by the law of the state ad quem are tolerated by Commu-
nity law. Equal treatment is all that could be derived from Ar-
ticle 52.
The French case just mentioned shows, however, that
freedom of establishment may include more than mere equal
treatment. A state may not deny to foreigners the right to
make use of all forms of establishment provided for in Article
52, even if it does so with regard to its own nationals. The
Klopp judgment 62 goes into the same direction by obliging
France to issue a permit to a German lawyer to have a second
establishment within France, even if French lawyers must have
only one establishment.
These judgments come close to what the Court has de-
cided under Article 60(3), which, like Article 52, grants equal
treatment. The Court has said that under this rule, the state ad
quem may possibly not be permitted to apply all itslIbw on prov-
iders of services.1 63 The question arises whether the Court
would follow this line if a similar question should arise under
Article 52. This would be no more an encroachment upon
mere equal treatment than the Court has created in the French
insurance case and in Klopp.
Again we must consider a policy argument: if future juris-
prudence should reduce freedom of services to cases where no
one is acting as a representative of the provider in the state ad
quem, most transient trade in services will depend on freedom
of establishment. Subjecting the provider completely under
the law of the state ad quem would exclude access of receivers to
services construed under the law of the state a quo. The gist of
the question is whether the Court wishes to be so restrictive
and thereby reduce the common market to a coexistence of na-
tional markets, or whether the Court will opt for a more open
market that benefits receivers by giving them a choice of pro-
viders. The answer cannot be derived from any case or schol-
arly interpretation of the Treaty because the policy question at
162. Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, Case 107/83, 1984 E.C.R.
2971, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,116.
163. See text accompanying supra notes 97-100.
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issue here has not been decided or discussed. Rather, we are
confronted with a new problem, whose solution will depend on
future policy considerations.
V. COORDINATION AND APPROXIMATION
A. Introduction
1. What Is Envisioned?
The Treaty, in Articles 63, 100, and 100(a), provides for
approximation of laws and for further Community acts known
as coordination. Typical coordination can comprise recogni-
tion of foreign diplomas as well as the cooperation of state au-
thorities aiming at control over professions or certain indus-
tries.
2. Present Discussion
Problems of approximation and coordination, as well as
other projects in the field of services, have been explored re-
cently by Wulf-Henning Roth."6 This frees us to concentrate
in this Part on some principal points. I shall discuss commer-
cial agents as examples of industrial or commercial activities,
and doctors as examples of professional activities. I will try to
show that policies have undergone considerable changes.
B. Commercial Agents
1. The Directives
Three directives are decisive: No. 64/222165 and No.
64/224,166 both from February 25, 1964, and more recently
No. 86/853, from December 18, 1986.167
a. The Permanent Provisional Solution
The directives of 1964 are representative insofar as they
proposed a provisional solution that became a permanent ap-
proach. The directives try to solve two problems. The second
directive strives for liberalization and therefore interdicts re-
164. Roth, Die Harmonisierung des Dienstleistungsrechts in der EWG, 21 EUROPARECHT
340 (1986) [hereinafter Roth I]; 22 EUROPARECHT 7 (1987) [hereinafter Roth II].
165. Council Directive No. 64/222, O.J. L 64/56 (1964).
166. Council Directive No. 64/224, O.J. L 64/56 (1964).
167. Council Directive No. 86/653, O.J. L 382/17 (1986).
19881
396 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:347
strictions. This approach aims more or less at non-discrimina-
tory treatment. If the state ad quem normally makes the activity
depend on whether the agent is a reliable person and has not
been bankrupt, a certificate of the state a quo or a specific assur-
ance under oath will have to be accepted. The first provisional
directive dealt with professional qualifications. Special
problems arose because not all states demand a specific qualifi-
cation for commercial agents. This situation led to the (provi-
sional) provision that three years of activity in the state a quo
must be recognized by the other states as sufficient qualifica-
tion. A safeguard clause protects states against any incommen-
surable influx of unqualified nationals of other Member States.
b. The 1986 Directive
Long discussions preceded a further directive that pro-
vided for the approximation of national laws insofar as they
govern the contracts between undertakings and their agents.
The details are not important here. What counts is the expla-
nation for this directive, given in its preamble. There are two
main reasons for the directive.
First, the disparities of national laws are said to influence
conditions of reasonable competition. The disparities also cre-
ate difficulties for contracts between agents and undertakings
established in different countries.
Second, while the foregoing reason may give rise only to a
question whether contract law really bears on the conditions of
competition, the second reason in the preamble gives rise to
questions concerning the competence of the Community. The
preamble explains that the common market shall be a single
market and that in such a market, uniform law is necessary. In
other fields such as consumer protection, documents rely on
Article 2 and contend that the Community has the task of safe-
guarding consumer interests and, thereby, standard of living
and the fulfillment of expectations of all concerned.' 68 This
may be questioned for a Community to which the states have
transferred limited sovereign rights only. The American expe-
rience could teach the Community a lesson as to the necessity
168. Council Resolution, O.J. C 92/1 (1975). For commentary, see Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,397.
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of uniform rules on commercial agents, consumer credit, prod-
uct liability, and the like.
2. The Legislative History
The legislative history of the 1986 directive depicts the
difficulties the Community confronts in liberalizing all profes-
sions and commercial activities. The plan of the directive was
mentioned first in 1969,169 and the directive was enacted in
1986. Debates started with conflict of laws and arrived at a
first conclusion that approximation of conflict of laws rules
would not satisfy the needs of a single market. 170 No research
on this behalf was performed, and those who know conflict of
laws specialists, will hardly believe that they are accustomed to
evaluating the influence of their patrimony on the functioning
of a common market. Then came a draft of the Commission' 7'
that was most ambitious in introducing strict law for contracts
between undertakings and their commerical agents. A long
period of discussion followed in the European Parliament,' 72
in the Economic and Social Council, 173 and, finally, in the
Council of Ministers, which had to reach a unanimous vote.
One of the major changes was that the directive, as enacted,
leaves more freedom of contract to the parties.
3. Conclusion
It is not difficult to imagine that the Community is under
pressure to look for other devices to create the legal frame-
work for the common market. Following the pattern of the
commercial agents for all other activities would be a Herculean
task for a Community barely resembling Hercules.
C. Medicine
The directives for general practitioners, as well as special-
169. COMMISSION, THIRD GENERAL REPORT 101, 69 (1969).
170. Equality of Rights for Commercial Agents, E.C. BULL., Supp. 1/77, at 5 (1977).
171. Proposed Council Directive, OJ. C 13/2 (1977).
172. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive to Coordinate the Laws of
the Member States Relating to (Self-Employed) Commercial Agents, O.J. C 239/17
(1978).
173. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive to Coordinate the Laws of
the Member States Relating to (Self-Employed) Commercial Agents, O.J. C 59/31
(1978).
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ists, may be used as a model for liberalizing the professions.
They represent a type of legislative work that serves freedoms
of establishment and of services at the same time.
1. Recognition of Diploma and Freedom of Services
There is a directive of June 16, 1975, on recognition of
diplomas and qualifications. 74 The states are obliged to rec-
ognize this directive enabling doctors to practice in other
countries. It must have been terribly difficult to agree on the
great number of diplomas that are covered by the directive.
The directive goes on to deal with further problems of
services, in Articles 16. The state ad quem has to accord equal-
ity of treatment to foreign doctors. When the doctors act in
the country ad quem without being established there, they may
not be subject to a duty to be a member of any professional
organization in the state ad quem, though they are subjected to
its professional rules. They need no authorization but may be
obliged to inform the state ad quem of their intention to provide
services. The directive aims at a certain cooperation of state
authorities.
This chapter of freedom of services may be of no great de
facto importance for doctors, but it can be said to be a model
for services regulation.
2. Education
Two directives above all, enacted in 1975'7' and 1986,176
aim at an approximation of law as a prerequisite for recogni-
tion of diplomas and freedom of services. Contrary to the case
of commercial agents and of industry, there is no question of
dealing with the law of contracts or responsibility of doctors, as
compared with product liability. Obviously, legal conditions of
competition and uniformity of law are dispensable for a "com-
mon market of medicine," which is governed by other rules.
All efforts have been concentrated on education, the stan-
dards of which should be equivalent. In this field, a change of
174. Council Directive No. 75/362, O.J. L 167/1 (1975). For commentary, see 1
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1486.23.
175. Council Directive No. 75/363, OJ. L 167/14 (1975). For commentary, see
1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1486.23.
176. Council Directive No. 86/457, O.J. L 267/26 (1986).
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policies cannot be overlooked. A first draft17 7 provided for
quantitative criteria, by envisioning a minimum education of
six years, including 5500 hours of teaching. This idea had to
be dropped because no quality could be guaranteed by this
method, and the independence of universities and the Member
States would be endangered by such an approach. Therefore,
the directive of 1975 was restricted to fixing the aims of medi-
cal education, leaving it to the states, on one hand to comply
with these provisions, and on the other hand to rely on the
efficiency of the systems in other states. This dependence on
reliance is an important element of recent policies in the field
of approximation of laws.
The directive of 1986 tries to improve medical education
by having regard to practical experience. It corresponds to Ar-
ticle 100a(3), as introduced into the EEC Treaty by the Single
European Act, according to which approximation of laws shall
attain a high level of protection.
3. Conclusion
Though there can be found some legislative restraint, de-
liberation on the directives has proved to be most cumber-
some. One danger must be taken into consideration: if future
developments make it necessary to amend the law, states re-
main bound by the directives. Only the complicated EEC pro-
cedure is available for improving the law. In areas like
medicine, where research and experience, the availability of
new methods, instruments, or social policies require a change
in education, the Community procedure could prove to be too
slow.
D. Legislative Restraint
The Commission in 1985 presented to the Council a pro-
posal for a new directive on recognition of all university diplo-
mas without prior approximation of laws and without distinc-
tion between the professions. 78 Specific legislation for some
professions is not excluded because Article 2(2) of the draft
provides that the directive shall not apply where specific direc-
177. Proposed Council Directive, J.O. C 54/17 (1969).
178. Proposal for a Council Directive on a General System for the Recognition
of Higher Education Diplomas, COM(85) 355 final.
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tives on the recognition of diplomas exist. Within the scope of
the new directive the states will just have to rely on qualifica-
tions and education obtained in other states. The directive en-
ables them only to subject foreigners to an adaptation program
of not more than four years. The Commission is to be ap-
plauded for the principle, because a single market demands
that everbody can supply services with the qualifications that
he has obtained in this market. The preamble mentions in this
context that as a citizen, everybody has the right to choose
where he gets his education and where he wants to practice.
The adaptation period could, however, make the directive an
ill-fitting instrument for freedom of services.
Any prognosis on the future of the draft is impossible. It
had to be mentioned, because it makes us realize how Commu-
nity measures would have to look if the Community, with its
limited resources, is to arrive at a single market. It would re-
duce its efforts in the fields of approximation and coordination
and refer to a sort of European full faith and credit clause, 179
ordering the states to rely on qualifications and qualities pro-
vided for in the law of other Member States and accept services
from outside, qualified pursuant to the law of the state a quo.
This includes a tendency to bypass what the Court has decided
on direct effect of Articles 30 and 59, where it leaves regulatory
power to the state ad quem for the protection of the common-
weal.
The question whether legislative power of the Community
reaches so far will be discussed in the context of insurance and
television, below.
E. Single European Act
The Single European Act, entered into force on July 1,
1987, has amended the Treaty. Approximation and coordina-
tion of laws shall contribute to complete what is now called the
internal market by the end of 1992. A declaration of the Con-
ference, added to the Single European Act, states that such
179. In an article published in 1971, the author refuted ideas that would include
a certain full faith and credit clause. The case law since Van Binsbergen does not per-
mit one to maintain this position. See Steindorff, Dienstleistungsfreiheit und ordre public,
in M. LAGRANGE, W. MOLLER, K. SIEG & E. STEINDORFF, DIENSTLEISTUNGSFREIHEIT
UND VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHT IM GEMEINSA NEN MARKT 79 (1971).
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tasks have to be completed, which are foreseen in the Commis-
sion's White Paper of June 14, 1985, on the completion of the
internal market. 1 80
VI. TELEVISION AND INSURANCE: WHERE COMMUNITY
POWER ENDS
A. Purpose of this Chapter
This chapter is not designed to present all the problems of
the television and insurance industries within the common
market. Those industries will be used, rather, to demonstrate,
where Community powers end, as compared to the powers of
Congress, which was able to enact the McCarran-Ferguson Act
and which has the power to repeal or to revise it. 18'
The proposals of the Community deal with all broadcast-
ing, but are mainly relevant to television. It is for this reason
that we take the liberty to speak of television only.
: . B. Exclusion of Freedom of Services
According to Articles 66 and 55(2), the Council, acting by
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may
rule that the provisions as to freedom of establishment and of
services shall not apply to certain services. No such rule has
been enacted. Some scholars suggest that these provisions
have become obsolete. 82
C. The Regulatory Problems
1. Television
On the basis of the Court decisions qualifying broadcast-
ing and transmission of television as services within Article 60,
the Commission has published a Greenbook on the common
market for television 11 together with other proposals, and it
has presented to the Council the draft of a directive for the
180. Commission, Completing the Internal Market, White Papers from the
Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
181. For the case law, see Kimball & Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarren-Fergu-
son Act: A Study in judicial Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1985).
182. Randelzhofer, Das Niederlassungsrecht, in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG,
supra note 140.
183. COM(84) 300 final (June 14, 1984).
19881
,402 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 11:347
approximation of the law regarding television.18 4 The Federal
Republic of Germany and its Lander (states) deny the compe-
tence of the Community to legislate in this field, because
within Germany it belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Under. If we accept that regulatory power exists, a further
question becomes relevant: the draft of the Commission pro-
vides for approximation of the laws mainly as to protection of
youth and as to advertising, thereby taking into account that in
Debauve the Court had no objections to state legislation exclud-
ing advertising from television.1 85 A uniform law, in this re-
spect, would abolish a restriction on freedom of services. But
we are confronted with another problem: German law, even
German constitutional law, has some strict rules as to the sub-
stance of television programs in other respects.' 86 Could these
rules still be applied to transmission of television, above all by
cable? The draft of the directive seems to permit that, while
the Commission, in its explanation of the draft, comes to the
opposite conclusion. Could an article be added to the draft
providing that, after implementation of the directive and ap-
proximation of the law as to advertising and protection of
youth, no other state regulations must be opposed to the
broadcasting and transmission of television? Here the ques-
tion of Community powers is at issue. When discussing the
recognition of foreign diplomas, we learned that the 1985 draft
aims at obliging the states to recognize foreign diplomas with-
out prior approximation of the law. It does, however, reserve
to the states the right to subject foreign providers of services
to an adaptation process and thus protect the state ad quem
against the intrusion of services, the standards of which seem
to be too low to the state ad quem. Could the Community rule,
by legislative act, that not even such a period of adaptation
could be required by the state ad quem?
184. COM(86) 146 final, E.C. BULL. Supp. 5/86 (1986). A survey of the preced-
ing documents is given in a resolution of the European Parliament of October 10,
1985, OJ. C 288/113 (1985).
185. Procureur du Roi v. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 859, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8661, at 7829-30.
186. See Kiubler, Die Neue Rundfunkordnung: Marktstniktur und Wettbewerbsbe-
dingungen, 40 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2961 (1987) (recent overview on
German law on the subject).
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2. Insurance
Under the impact of the insurance judgment, the Commu-
nity has resumed deliberations on a directive liberalizing serv-
ices. According to the Court's judgment in the case of Commis-
sion v. Germany, two points must be regulated, above all, techni-
cal reserves of insurers and the control of insurers'
conditions.' 8 7 The Court did not mention the private law of
the insurance contract or the conflict of laws rules pertaining
to these contracts. Contrary to commercial agents, approxima-
tion of laws in these fields may be deemed to be superfluous,
though many efforts have already been made to achieve uni-
form law.' 8 But let us suppose that the Community should
achieve approximation as to technical reserves and conditions
of insurers, after more than a decade of frustration. Would the
Community have to accept the German law, which imposes
uniform conditions on insurers by not authorizing an insurer
to do business without applying the standard conditions, ap-
proved by the competent authority? German law does so to
achieve trahs'parency of the market for the benefit of the in-
sured.' 89 However, the law burdens interstate trade by ham-
pering foreign insurers in their use of their domestic condi-
tions. Could such a German provision, designed for consumer
protection, simply be outlawed by a Community directive?
D. The Answers
1. Direct Effect and Regulatory Power
Pursuant to quite a series of cases, direct effect of Articles
30 and 59 does not exclude measures of the state ad quem, pro-
tecting non-economic general interest such as consumer pro-
tection. But this power of the states comes to an end where
the Community has regulated-perhaps one could say where it
has occupied-the field. This follows from the law as to free
movement of goods. In Cassis de Dion and in Rau v. de Smedt,
187. Case 205/84, 1986 E.C.R. , , Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,339, at
17,164.
188. See UNIV. CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, L'HARMONISATION DU DROIT DU CON-
TRAT D'ASSURANCE DANS LA C.E.E. (1981).
189. For the most recent surveys and discussion, see W.-H. ROTH, INTERNATION-
ALES VERSICHERUNGSVERTRAGSRECHT 650-761 (1985); Chapatte, Freedom to Provide In-
surance Services in the European Community, 9 EUR. L. REV. 3 (1984).
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the Court held that under Article 30, restrictive measures of
the states could be justified only "in absence of common
rules. '"9 This implies, first, that state law can conflict with Ar-
ticle 30, because Community rules exist. Second, directives, by
themselves, have a binding effect for the states within Article
189(3),' and once directives for the approximation of law
have been enacted, the states cannot deviate from these direc-
tives for the purpose of protecting the general interest. Ger-
many, therefore, could not enact stricter rules against pollu-
tion by automobiles, because Community law had regulated.' 92
Mr. Braun, General Director of the Commission, has explained
in a discussion that this was the reason why the Single Euro-
pean Act introduced an exception in favor of the states. This
brings us to the question whether there are limits for the bind-
ing effect of Community directives, excluding regulatory
power of the states.
The Single European Act has introduced Article 100a into
the EEC Treaty, as of July 1, 1987. On one hand, this Article
facilitates Community action, in that approximation of laws
may be passed by a majority of the Council, in forms not lim-
ited to directives. On the other hand, Article 100a(4)-(5) gives
a sort of a countervailing power to the states: the Member
States may, for limited purposes, still impose their law against
imports, under the control of the Commission. These provi-
sions will not play an important role in the field of services.
2. Limits of Direct Effect and of Regulatory Power
For the second limit, we must start from a proposition.
We suppose that there could be a Court decision confirming
direct effect of Article 59 with respect to television, but con-
firming also that, according to the insurance cases, the state ad
quem is still entitled to enforce public policy insofar as the
Community has not regulated, and, in order to protect vital
constitutional interests, exclude foreign broadcasts from trans-
190. Rau v. De Smedt, 1982 E.C.R. at 3972, 12, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8879, at 8352. It is also necessary for such rules to be proportionate to the aim in
view. Id., Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8879, at 8352.
191. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189(3), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 60, 298
U.N.T.S. at 179.
192. See generally Steindorff, Umweltschutz in Gemeinschaftshand?, 30 RECHT DER IN-
TERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 767 (1984).
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mission via cable. 9 3 We thereby refer to the German argu-
ment that important constitutional issues are at stake in this
field. Could the Community enact any measure that dictates,
as the Commission seems to envision, that these state interests
are incompatible with Community law and that, therefore, the
state ad quem (in the potential case, Germany) is under a duty
to permit transmission of foreign broadcasts by cable, if only
questions of advertising or protection of youth have been
solved by a directive? Could the Member State then still regu-
late the service to protect other, perhaps constitutional inter-
ests, if those interests were unaddressed by any directive? If
the Member State were barred in such a situation, then direct
effect of Article 59, as construed by the Court, could be en-
larged by way of Community directives.
The question, as raised here, has not yet been decided. It
was hardly ever raised. This is easy to understand, because no
opposition to a Community measure could be expected, while
most directives had to be voted unanimously. Now that major-
ity votes have been provided for in Article 100a and that, in
Germany, the interests not of the federation but of the Lander
are involved, the question could soon become relevant. We
cannot solve it here. Many arguments could be made for a
rule, according to which the limits of direct effect, as ex-
pounded by the Court in its jurisprudence as to freedom of
services, may limit also the legislative power of the Commu-
nity; where the limits of direct effect have to do with important
state interests, it is the task of the Community to abolish re-
strictions by approximation and coordination of laws, and
thereby extend the freedoms or facilitate the exercise of such
freedoms. However, state law cannot just be suppressed, and
approximation as well as coordination must not disregard vital
state interests. Article 6(2) is an expression of a more far-
reaching principle, according to which the Community itself
must protect such interests. Community measures would, ac-
cording to our suggestion, be valid only if, by approximating
or coordinating the law of the Member States, they arrive at
some balance between Community and state interests. The
193. As this Article went to press, it was reported that the Commission has
brought an action against the Netherlands for violation of Article 59, for not allowing
cable transmission of foreign broadcasts including advertising created for the Dutch
Market. O.J. C 85/3 (1988).
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1985 project on diplomas corresponds to this suggestion, by
providing for an adaptation period and by leaving the door
open for special state regulations with respect to sensible pro-
fessions. A directive simply excluding state measures, which
are proportionate, may violate constitutional rules of the Com-
munity and could, eventually, be attacked before the Court.
Only the Court can, by granting direct effect to Article 59, de-
cide where state powers have come to an end.
CONCLUSION
The limits of Community power could be explained only
in the form of questions. But such questions may suffice to
demonstrate what a Community is, to which the Member
States have transferred only limited sovereign rights.
All details that have been explained here may contribute
to form a mosaic of what was indicated in the introduction: the
EEC Treaty, by establishing a common market, has become the
starting point for developing fundamental freedoms, freedom
of services being one of them. Judge Everling,.who partici-
pated in the drafting of the EEC Treaty on the German side,
has broadened the picture in a recent article on freedoms of
establishment and of services. 194 There is a permanent strug-
gle between, on the one hand, the strive for preservation of
state powers, and, on the other hand, the implementation of
freedoms to trade within the EEC.
Community legislation has proved to be too cumbersome
a process to achieve uniform law and thereby abolish restric-
tions on trade in services. This is the reason why the judiciary
has stepped in and has outlawed quite a number of state acts
and measures as being incompatible with freedom of services.
One must refrain from dogmatizing the case law, because the
European Community will be confronted, for years to come,
with new problems in the field of services and will be forced to
reshape the balance between freedoms to trade and such pub-
lic goals that are still protected by state law. The Single Euro-
pean Act envisions the common market as an internal market
where services may be provided across state borders if they are
194. Everling, Vertragsverhandlungen 1957 und Vertragspraxis 1987, in EINE
ORDNUNGSPOLITIK FOR EUROPA (E.-J. Mesticker, H. M611er & H.-P. Schwarz eds.
1987).
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in conformity with the rules of the states a quo. There will be
interaction between Community legislation and the judiciary.
This interaction can be shown in the field of insurance. As this
Article was going to press, the Council, under the guiding in-
fluence of the insurance judgments and under the imperative
mandate of the Single European Act, tentatively accepted the
Commission's revised bill facilitating interstate insurance in
the field of commercial insurance. The bill now awaits the Par-
liament's opinion and then final council acceptance. Future
case law may extend freedom of services beyond this piece of
legislation. Freedom of services in general and insurance in
particular may be understood to be a part of Community law,
which creates a process of permanent integration without fix-
ing its final result.
An evaluation of the progress that has taken place so far
must take into consideration some basic problems. Services,
whether in banking, insurance, medical treatment, or telecom-
munications, are goods of a sensitive nature, and in many
states are regulated by law for the benefit of both consumers
and functioning systems of medical care, insurance, etc. Regu-
lation cannot just be suppressed, if the Community does not
wish to sacrifice consumer protection and other aims for free-
dom of services. This trade-off may explain why a country
such as the Federal Republic of Germany, which aims at free
markets for its exports, tends at the same time to safeguard
quite a number of its acts regulating services. Such regulation
inevitably creates a burden for interstate trade in services. As
long as each Member State regulates its own market, including
services coming from other states, the Community will be no
more than a conglomerate of state markets open to some ex-
tent to each other.
To achieve a single or internal market, several questions
must be answered: are there restrictive state regulations that
should be abandoned completely because they restrain inter-
state services to an unreasonable extent and possibly camou-
flage an intention to protect domestic providers of services?
And who is to answer this question: the European Court or
Community legislation? And if regulation is indeed justified
for the commonweal, by which means should the level of legal
protection accorded consumers be balanced against burdens
on interstate trade-Community legislation, enacted by the
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Council with a minor contribution by the European Parlia-
ment, or by state legislation? Even though the European Par-
liament is chosen by general elections, the political power in
Europe remains with the states. It is the state governments
that bear the responsibility for any mischief resulting from in-
sufficient legislation. They will have to respond to the public.
Which members of state parliaments can afford to neglect their
constituency and allow state legislative power to be dismantled
in favor of a single European market? Even if state powers are
defended by the pressure of lobbying, as is often the case, or
even if state legislation restrains interstate services for out-
dated reasons, such resistance to change has its roots in his-
tory. And history may weigh more in politics than does the
rationality of a single market. If an evaluation of freedom of
services starts from these premises, then it must be said that
within barely three decades of the European Community quite
some progress has been achieved. As far as law can, the Com-
munity has not only designed but applied rules that, if applied
and adapted to new problems in the future, may contribute to
freedom of services in Europe as if there were only one inter-
nal market.
